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EFFECT UPON THE COMPETENCY
OF WITN-ESSES.
Self-interest is perhaps the fundamental fact in human
nature. Every man naturally seeks to promote the welfare
of himself and his family before that of his neighbor. Un-less he be largely influenced by considerations of morality or
religion, he will, if necessary, tell a lie for that purpose.

Even in a highly moral conmunity of to-day, a man who
will never misrepresent is extremely rare-. In the primitive
ages he was probably an unknown species. Ie is, exclusively, the product of education and religious training.
Of self-interest is born distrust of others. If a man will
lie to serve his own interests, he will instantly suspect his
neighbor of doing the same thing.
It is, therefore, a natural presumption and we can safely
assume from the evidence that primitive man had little faith
in the accuracy of facts, related to him by.his fellows, if
they in any way affected the interests of the relators. With

the growth of his intelligence. however, he clearly realized
that it is impossible for a well-ordered comunity to exist
unless some reliance can be placed upon the words -of the
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members of that comnunity. Some means, therefore, had to
be devised, bv which men could be bound to tell the truth
and to p1erform their promises, so that there might be faith
between them.
The evidence of the customs of prehistoric times must be
found largely in survivals of those customs, particularly
among primitive, trilbes as they now exist. Among uncivilized people in, various parts of the world, a few ancient
methods of binding a man to speak the truth are still extafit.
It is said that in Siberia. when a member of the wild tibe
of Ostyaks is to be-a witness, the head of a wild boar is
brought into court.' The Ostyak wiIl then- imitate the actions of the-boar in eating and call upon wild boars in general to devour himn if he does not speak the truth. The
efficacy of the ceremony depends upon the fact that the
witness believes he will fall a victim to the ferocity of a
boar if he fails to keep his pledge. "
There are numerous similar customs which are related
upon very good authority. They involve calling upon a
beast, a mountain, the sun. a river or some similar thing, to
witness the truth of one's words and to destroy him if they
be untrue. Those who perform these ceremonies are said
to implicitly believe that the thing invoked will avenge. a
falsehood.by the destruction of the witness and perhaps of
his descendlants.2
These customs endly about all.we know concerning the
origin of "oaths." They were methods of securing a'guarantee of truth. The oe demanding the. pledge. would insist
upon its being taken in the name of the being which, as he
1

"Travels'in Siberia." by Erman. Vol. I, p. 492. This book was
published in 1848. 1 do not' k-now whether the custom still exists.
'In India some tribes, particularly the Santals, make assertions
upon the skinis of tigers. believing tigers will avenge a false statement
by devouring them. Tyler in Oaths. p. i(Q. Encyclopedia Britannica,
9th ed.. Vol. I& p. 718; see tl-;o article O(aths," by R. V. Rogers, 9
Green Bag, 57. Among the Egyptians assertions in the names-of beasts
were very common. "yler. p. 145: Rollin's Ancient Hist.. Vol. I, C. 2.
In New Guinea it is said. that soine tribes still call the sun or mountains
to witness, believing the sun will burn them or the mountains will fall
uljon them if they -pe:tk falsely. See authorities Supra. Assertions
made by calling to.witnecs cekstial bodies are also mentioned by Baron
Puffendorf, chapter on Oaths.
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tlti!-,t. inspired the most awe in the breast, of the swearer.
This ,,h\-iu'y would be some go or supernatural being
in whom he believed and whom he feared. Oaths were
consequently iaken in a multitude of ways. They were very
numerous among the Egyptians. Carthaginians, Greeks,

Persians, Romans. Jews. etc., and in each case conformed
to the prevailing religious belief.
'In Egypt oaths were sworn in the names of various sacred beasts,
as we have said, also by various mythical deities, Isis, Osiris, etc., and
b v the lives of their kings, who, particularly after their death, were
thought to become invested with supernatural attributes. "By the life
of Pharaoh" was a form of oath which the Jews borrowed from Egypt
and for the use of which, with other "false oaths," they were afterwards
rebuked. Gen. xlvi. i5, 16.
The Carthaginians swore by many gods and by sacred rivers and
celestial bodies. Polyhius reports a treaty of peace between Philip
of Macedonia and the Carthaginians, which was concluded "in
the presence of Jupiter. Juno and Apollo: in the presence of the
lehmon of the Carthaginians. of Hercules and Iolaus; in the presence
of Mars, Triton and Neptune; in the presence of all the confederate
gods of the Carthaginiais. and of the sun. moon and the earth; in the
presence of the rivers, meads and waters; in the presence of all these
.gods who posess Carthage." This conglomerate mixture of Greek"
and Catithaginian gods was deemed to make the treaty solemnly binding on both parties.
The.oaths of the ancient Greeks were as numerous as the sands
of the sea. They swore separately and collectively by "all the gods
in the calendar," by the "Watrs of the Styx." Resiod, Theog. 4oo.
by the sacred altar, by the souls of the departed, Xenocrates, Epist.
Attic. Lih. 1, t6. by the ashes of their fathers. etc. Tyler on Oaths,
C. 3. The Persians swore by the stars, Puffendorf, supra Xenophon
represents Cyrus as swearing in this wise: "I swear to thee, Lysander,
by Mithrt, never -. her, in health to take my chief meal before I have
diwharged the duties of exercise." The Romans swore by their gods,
by "'the genius of the Emperor," hy Hercules, etc. After the murder
of C:esar the Ronai Senate expressly established an oath, "by the
genius of C.sar." Dio. Lib. XLIV. See also Tyler, C. 4. See further
as to various forms of oaths in ancient countries; Tyler .on. Oaths;
Iotter on Oaths; "Oaths." 9 Green Bag. 57;'Menage Divy, Laertius,
Liil. 1I.section 40; 1 erodotus Lib. IV; Sozomenus, Lib. V. See also
Bishop Sanderson De Jura. Obligat. Praelect 1, see. 4; Ovid Amor.
lk.Ill, El. 3. 13. 14: Ovid Trist. Lib. V. El. 4, 45. 46; Atheneum
Deipnosoph, Lib. IX. Cap. 2; Apollonins Lib. VI. Cap. 9; Virgil,
Aeneas IX, v. 3oo Apuleius De Deo Soerat; Pliny Lib. I, Epist.
,no,N. 5.6. Lysias Orat. Advers. Diagiton; Pietr. della Valle Itin., Part
1I, Epist. i; Ensheius Eccle. Hist. Lib. IV, C. 15: Grammond Hist.
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The earliest record of an oath taken in the name of the
God of the Jews and Christians, and perhaps the earliest
satisfactory
record of any oath is that found in the Book Of
Genesis. 4 It is there related that Abimelech came to Abrahamn an(l said. "'God is with tl.hee in all that thou doest. Now
therefore swear unto me here by God, that thott wilt not
deal falsely with me, nor with my son, nor with my son's
son; but according to the kindness that I have done unto
thee, thou shalt do unto me and to the land wlerein thou
hast sojourned. And Abraham said- I will swear." This
passage clearly shows that both among the Jews and also
among the inhabitants of Gerar,.where Abraham then was,
the custom of swearing was well known. Abimelech probably
did not believe in the God of the Jew's, but he required
Abraham to swear by his God knowing that such an oath
would be binding upon him. The Jews of course were the
only nations of antiquity that swore by Jehovah. 5
Gall. Lib. V; Ulpian's Dig. of Civil -Laws, Lib XII, Tit, 2, De Jurejurando, Leg. 33; Procopius, De Bell. Persic. Lib I, C. 3; Ducas. Hist.
Bysant, C. 22; Adams? Ant. 247; Cic. Fain. Ep. VII, 1, 12; iz Law
Mag. 272.

-

'Genesis xxi. 22, 23, 24. In the Code of Laws of Hammurahi, king
of B3abylonia, at about 225o B. C. we find records of oaths of even an
earlier date. This king (the same as Amraphdel, king of Shinar)
was a contemporary of Abrahaili and hence his code was written long
before Moses composed the book o f Genesis. His code, graven upon
a huge block of black diorite, was recently discovered by M. de Morgan,
conducting excavations at Susa in Elam on behalf of certain French
scientists. This code contains no less than twelve instances where
oaths were required in judicial procedure..
"The peculiar form which they used may be seen from another
passage in Genesis xxiv. 2. 3. 9. "And Abraham said unto his eldest
servant of his house, that ruled over all .that he had, Put I pray thee
thy hand under my thigh: And I will make thee swear by the Lord,
the God of heaven and the God of the earth that thou shalt not take
a wife unto my son of the daughters of the Cananites. anong whom
I dwell . . . And the servant pint his hand' under the thigh of
Abraham his master, and sware to him concerning. that matter." See..
also. Gen. xli. 29. The custom of holding tup the hand when prononncing the words of- the oath was also common among the Jews.
In the honk of Get'esis wvhen the King of Sodom. was temiting Almraham to retain certain goods whiclf le had captured in battle lie refused.
saying, -I have lirted tip my hand unto the 1,ort, the most high God.
possessor of heaven and earth, that I will not take front a thread
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After the beginning of the Christian era the oath by the
Cbristian God was adopted by-those who professed Christianity. The very early Christians of the Apostolic age used
no oaths at all, or at least were opposed to their use because
they believed them to be productive of evil., and to have been
forbidden by Christ in His sermon on the Mount." When
Christianity, however, became the religion of the civilized
world the "heathen" custom of swearing was carried bodily
into the Christian Church. The world which embraced
Christiamity was so far wedded to the custom that it was
"deemed indispensable.

After the Church had grown to such tremendous proportions and so much pomp and ceremony were subjoined to
the worship of God. oaths multiplied to a very great extent.'
There were almost as many different oaths sanctioned by
the Christian world as there had been among the Greeks.
The laying of hands on the book and -kissing it were known
very early. Sozomenus records an oath to the Emperor
Theodosius by laying hands on the book,7 and during the
time of Pope Nicholas the kissing of the Holy Scriptures
was known according to an incident related by Arsenius.'
Later the practice of swearing by innumerable holy symbols.
hand the like was introduced. Oaths by the Virgin, by the
Cross, by the "body of Christ." "by God's Arms Two," by
"Nails and by Blood." etc.'
even to a shoe latchet, and that I will not take anything -that is thine,

lest thou shouhlst say, I have made Abram rich" Sece also Deut.
xxxii. 40, Ex. vi. 8, Dan. xii. 7, Rev. x. 5,Psalms cv. 9, Jer. xL..4,
Numbers xxx. 13, Deut. xxix. r2, Josh. ii. 19, Ibid. ix. 2o, Judges xxi.
5, I Sam. xiv. 26. 1I Ibid. xxi. 7, I Kings ii. 43, Ibid. viii. 31, I Chron.
xv. 15. Nehein. x. , Ezek. xvi. 59. Dan. ix. it, Zach. viii. 17, Mat. xiv.
17, Ibid. xxvi. 72, Luke i. 73, Acts ii. 30, Ibid xxiii. 12, 21, Hebrews
vii. 21, 28, James v. iz, FEzek. xxi. :-3,
IHahak. iii.
9,Mat. V. 33.
'See
Constantine Aug. De Civ. Dei; Tyler. C. VI; Dynond's

Essays, C. VII; Grotiu. Rights of War and Peace; Tertullian, De
Idol.. Cap. II.
owz, iensIleEnagri..
'D Cange, 1607.
'There were a gr$at many oaths of course which have not been
and cannot even be mentioned here. Oaths in far eastern countries
T have entirely omitted, becaubc I have been unable to find any records
of them, except such as have been written in and concerning recent

378

OATHS IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AND. THEIR

There is one essential feature of all these oaths which
furnishes the keynote of their real or supposed efficiency,
viz: Each cereni ivy Of oath taking involves an expressed or
implied imprecation of the vengeance of the being inmoked.
if the-swearer does not speak the truth.

It has already

times, and I will speak of them later, The modern oaths of China.
India. and other Asiatic countries (in so far as they exist at-all), are
evidently old forms which have survived from a much earlier period,
but I have no proof of it at hand. Oaths have been found wherever
human society exists, and hence we may safely say that "swearing"
in some form is a natural and universal custom. Other forms not
specifically mentioned will be found among the citations herein given,
which are believed to include everything of importance ever written
in the English language.
The oaths to which I have referred were those tendered on solemn
occasions, when the truth uns being diligently -sought. As is usually
the case, howei'er, where a custom of this kind has become established,
it was used on occasions to which it was not at all adapted. An impious
man seeing how much credit was added to one's words if they were
spoken under oath, would voluntarily swear to statements, the truth
of which he desired to impress upon his hearers, when in fact they were*
untrue. In such cases if he .were at all fearful of the punishment of the
gods, he would swear by some-deity or thing of which he felt less fear
or none at all. Thus arose the great cloud of oaths which are -sometimes called "false ,aths." The ancients invented a multitude of them,
and it is not necessary to stop to consider them, furtheir than to say.
that they consisted of oaths sworn by inanimate or non-sacred things.
or by calling upon the names of gods which were obsolete (so to
speak).-

Potter says in "Oaths of Greece" that Socrates swore by a dog.
and Lucian in commenting upon this report says, "What think ye?
does not the dog appear to you a divinity? See ybu not how great in
Egypt is Anuhis. and in heaven Scrius, and among the infernals
Cerberus." Thifs oath if it was so taken was I think merely a jocular
or falsie oath.
William Rufus, King of England. habitually swore "per vultum de
Lucca." Tiler devotes a chapter ta discussing the origin of this oath.
and ascribee it to a certain painting or figure of Christ in the Chpcl of
Lucca in Tnscany which was thought to have been brought there by
zniracniuos means. thus the oath would mean, "by the face of God
in the Chapel of Lucca." I think it quite as likely, however that
illiam. who is descrised to us as being not'at .all distinguished for
c.vt . adopted it simply because it had' a euphonious- souind. and
proal4y thought it meant what it is usually translated to mean. "'by
the face of St. I.uh"
Them were also many oaths, such as "by SL raul's bell," "by the
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been related how among primitive tribes, those who swore
in the nanie of beasts, or of inanimate things'believed the
thing invoked would avenge the insult of a false oath. This
expectation or imprecation, particularly among the older

forms, was usually expressly stated,10 but whether so

rood," "by the halidome" (holy dome), etc., which can hardly rise .to
the dignity of true oaths. They certainly were never used upon judicial
or other similar occasions. At the present time "By Jove," "Jupiter,"
etc., are common as mere exclamations or by way of emphasis. Similarly arose the vulgar and impious habit so prevalent at the present
time of swearing in ordinary speech, merely by way of rounding out
one's sentences and with no thought of the import of the words used.
Various forms of solemn compact have sometimes been .referred
to as oaths, e. g., the custom of clasping hands in confirmation of an
agreement, or more anciently killing an animal and drinking the blood,
or even the practice of cutting a cock or pig in halves by a blow of a
sword and imprecating a similar fate upon one's self if his words be
untrue. I think none of these are properly oaths at all. There is no
calling upon a supernatural being, merely an emphatic way of saying,
"I speak the truth." Later in England the expression, "I hope I may
die if I speak not the truth" was used. It is a mere vulgar expression.
Ptffcndorf and Tyler also both speak of various forms of oaths
sworn upon weapons or by the members of the body, or by the bright
eyes or the golden tresses of one's mistress, etc. I have found no
record of such oaths being used upon solemn occasions,- such as
judicial proceedings-hence I pass them with the remark that' they
should he classed with frivolous or "false oaths," not being intended
to really hind, hut only to be used by way of emphasis. One exception
should be noted, viz: that where a weapon or other inanimate thing had
been made sacred by some c.remony, a false oath on this weapon or
thing was deemed blasphemy of the deily to which it had been consecrated.
A curious instance of an oath upon a weapon is mentioned in
V Scotti.sh law Rev. io6. An old forestry law"is there quoted to the
effect that if a stranger is found in a forbidden place in the forest and
henlce is liable to be punished, he may free himself by swcaring on his
"Wapin" that he did not know the way, but wandered into the forest
by mistake. This probably arose from a common custom of swearing
on weapons, then prevalent anl the essential significance, or insignificance of an oath so taken was probably unnoticed.
"Among the Hindoos it is believed that a false witness "shall be
fast bound under water in ti,.. naky cords of Varuna, and he shall
be wholly deprived of power to escape torment during a hundred tranimigrations; let mankind give, therefore, no false testimony....
Headlong and in utter darkness shall the impious :,retch tumble into
hell, who, being intcrrogated in a judicial inquiry, answers one question

380

OATHS IN

JUDICIAL

PROCEEDINGS AND THEIR

expressed or not it was the fundamental ilea of the
oath. To. be more explicit. it was a belief that a supernattral behing. called upon to witness the truth of the
swearer's w, rds, would feel itself outraged by a lie told
under the sanctity of that ceremony and would avenge the
consequential insult or blaspheny. How this idea first
originiated we can" only conjecture, but it is not at all surprising to find it among people who believed in the divinity
of thingi which they understood but little, and who thought
those supposed deities. whether they were savage beasts,
dark and mighty rivers, unexplored mountains; celestial
bodies, or mere creatures of imagination, exercised a direct
and personal control'over the doings of men.

They, there-

fore, as we could well believe, were the evidence less convincing than it is, also thought such a divinity would act as
a witness and an avenger when called upon.-

It follows from what has been said that the purpose of
the oath was to frighten the swearer into telling the truth.
Whether or not this purpose was accomplished. depended
quoted in Appleton on Evidence, p. 257. For various other
forms of a similar character see Ibid. C. XVI. One form of Roman
oath called the oath "Per Jovem Lapiden" concludes thus, "If I
knowingly deceive . . . may Jupiter cast me away from all that is
good. as I do this stone." the 'Swearer at the same time casting away
a stone. Polybius IIL 25.
In some instances the words of imprecation were added to oaths
given in the Old Testament Ruth to Naomi says, "The Lord do so
to me and more also.if aught but death part thee and me." Ruth i. 17.
The same words were used by Fli to Samuel when he was adjuring
him to speak the truth. I Sam. iii. 17.
Many of the later Christian oaths contained express imprecations
,of God's vengeance for false swearing. Selden says that among the
Spaniards the oath used in making a covenant concluded thus, "If I
first
designedly fail of this oath on that day. ye ptwers above torment
my body in thli life and my soul in the next with horrid tortures.
Make my strength and my wi'rds fail. Tn battle let my horse and
arms and spurs and sulbjeet, fail nie when need i, the sorest." IT. it.
The words now used. "So helip mc God," at present little under,.tood. are but a shorter way of expredsing the same imprecation.
When this precise form wa,; first adopted is uncertain. Tyler says that
lie ha; been unable to find atiy oath in England which does not contain it or a %niilar'phrase. The meaning of the phrase is. "So may God
help ie at the jutdgnrt (lay if I speak t-tie. but if T speak false, then
may i-e withdraw INi blti frimmu tue." Tyler, C. ITL
falsely,"
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entirely upon his state of mind. It was necessary that he
should believe two things: (i) That the being upon whom
he called ha~l a supernatural power to search his heart and
to divine the lie hidden there, (2) That th at being would be
outraged by the affront of a false oath and would punish
him for it. If he did believe, and ifhe was compelled to
faithfully perform the ceremony -'hich was supposed to
arouse the watchfulness of his god, then he would in all
probability tell the truti, unless his hope of immediate
gain by lying overbalanced his fear. of future punishment
by an outraged deity. If,on the other hand, the swearer
had no fear of the deity upon whoml he called, or if he
could evade the ceremony in some particular, or if he did
not believe the god wyould be offended by the ceremonial
breach, then the oath became a mere cloak for lying." The
" In ancient times there is no doubt that the oath was of great
efficacy in securing the truth. During many centuries of the world's
history no important act of state was iver undertaken without first
seeking sonic external sign of the approval or disapproval of the gods.
The whole business of a nation could be tied up by the behavior of
a chicken in eating its food, or by virtue of the appearance of the
entrails of a beast, or by the foolish tale of an augur or an oracle.
The human race held' a very material idea of the duties of 'the
celestial beings. They believed that they arranged and governed the
material affairs of men to the minutest detail, and would judge each
act and manifest by some external sign their approval or disapproval
in advance.
The oath was the direct product of this idea. The ancients believed
that a god would, when called upon, witness the truth of the speaker's
words, and if he spoke falsely would then wreak upon him a special
punishment for the affront offered. It is true that such -absurd and
childish ideas were soon abandoned by tte" educated classes; but inasmuch as the belief of the swearer is the only thing oi importance, the
one who administered the oath need 'not believe in it at alL
Polybius asserts that superstitions reverence was fostered advisedly
among the common people of Rome, for the very reason that'they
ctald thereby be controlled by wise men, who did not themselves
believe in the things they made use of. He says: "The gicat superionity of the Roman constitution appears to me to consist in their senti-.
ments towards their gods; and what seems to be held as a reproach
among other nations, appears to me to be the preservative of the
Roman State, a suf1erstitions reverence for their divinities; for this
principle is carried to such an extravagant pitch among them, that
nothing can exceed it, whether in the lives of individuals or the gen-
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thought that should be particularly noticed is that the oath
was believed to create an obligation to tell the truth not
prcviously existing. If the gods summoned as witnesses
by the- oath would have punished without such a ceremoiy
for the sin of lying, it does not appear that the fear of such
punishment was in any way relied upon as a guarantee of
truth. But the insult involved in a false oath was believed
to involve the most awful consequences.2
eral conduct of the stat, a circumstance this whiclr to many might
seem marvellous. I, however, am persuaded that they adopted this
system for the sake of the body of the people. Had they had to form
a commonwealth of wise men only, such a system would perhaps not
have been necessary; but since every populace is full of levity and
lawless desires, anger uncontrolled by reason and impetuosity- of
temper driving them on to violence, the only expedient left is to
restrain them by invisible terrors and such-likc alarming fictions. The
ancients consequ'iently in my opinion brought in their doctrines about
the gods and the affairs of hell -for the belief of the people, not at
random and by chance." Tyler, p. 139.
On the other hand if the swearer had no belief, the oath was of
course but an idle form, pernicious in that it induced credulity in
others.
Plutarch relates that Callippus, after having sworn "the great oath"
not to harm Dion-which "great oath" consisted of various weird ceremonies supposed to greatly add to the solemnity of the occasion, and
was taken in the consecrated lane of Ceres, the goddess-heded so
little its supposed obligation that he committed the murder of Dion
upon the very birthday of the goddess by whom he had sworn. He
purposely waited until that day in order to show his contempt for the
ceremony.
"2The exact truth of these observations may be clearly seen from
two well-known facts in history: (i)" The great sacrifices which the
ancients would make to avoid breaking their oaths. (2) The utter disregard for honor or truth whirh they exhibited when by some technicality they had been excused, as they imagined, from the performance
of an oath.
As an exanple of the first may be mentioned the Scriptural instance
of Jephtha killing his daughter, i'ho met him on his return from the
war. he having sworn to sacrifice the first creature that camne out to
meet him. The sacrifice of John the Baptist is another familiar
example. Hlertol did not want to give the "head of the prophet to the
daughter of ITerodias. with whose dancing he was pleased, "yet for
his nath's sake** he commanded that it be given to her.
Plutarch says that Lycurgus, having secured the passage of wise
laws and a promise of the people not to repeal these laws until his.
return, voluntarily bani.hcd hin.elf from Sparta, and, dying, ordered

EFFECT UPON TIE CO.MPETENCY OF WITNESSES.

383

Such in brief being the essential character of the oath,
the next step in the development of the subject is to trace
its use. For purposes of this paper we may roughly divide
oaths with. respect to their use into (i) Oaths used upon
non-judicial occasions and (2) Those used in judicial proceedings. With the first .class we have little to do. It comprises oaths given and required in ordinary transactions,
whenever one man desired a solemn asseveration from
another. It was at one time common for an oath to be
given in confirmation of a contract."3 and there is competent evidence that the Roman courts recognized the use
of the oath as imposing more solemn obligations in various
civil matters.' 4 Its use in treaties between nations, . and
upon other innumerable occasions of ancient society, was
common. It has also from very ancient times been deemed
a proper and necessary ceremony to be performed by any
person about to le )laced in a position of trust, e.g., when he
is about to he inducted into an office of some kind. Practically
all public officers in the greater number of countries ofthe
his ashes to- be thrown into the sea. He rested secure in the belief
that, no matter what happened, their oath would prevent the repeal of
the laws by the Spartans. Lycurg. Justin. L. I1, C. 3.
. As examples of the sccond fact may be mentioned the instance of
the Roman captive who was allowed to depart from the enemy's camp,
having sworn to return. Wihen he had gone'but a little way he came
back on pretence of having forgotten something, and then remained
permanently at Rome, having fulfilled his oath as he claimed, Puffendorf, 345. Likewise we are told that Dercyllides, besieging the city
of Scepsis, requested the leader of the enemy to come out to a parley,
swearing to give him an immediate safe return. When he came out,
Dercyllides ordered him to open the city's gates on pain of death, and
accompanied him (safely) with his army back into the city. Polyaen
Strateg., L. II, C. 6. So also the Count de la Fontain. having sworn
never to fight the French either on foot or on horseback, had himself
carried in a chair again-t them. Benj. Prioli Hist. GaI., . II. In the
same way as Aelian says, Cleomenes the Spartan, whc had sworn
never to do anything without the head of Archonides (meaning to
make him a confidential adviser), cut it off, placed it in a vessel of
honey, and always consulted it before undertaking any business. V. H.
Lib. XII, C. 8. Many other such instances are mentioned by Puffen.
dorf. supra.
'nMuirhead's
Roman Law, p. St.

11Ibid. t65.
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world are to-day required to subscribe to an oath before
presuming to discharge their duties. Oaths of allegiance,
formerly universal, are now less often required, particularly
in English-speaking countries, than formerly.' 5
The main theme of this paper is tie second class, viz:
oaths used in judicial proceedings; those which have been
adopted as a part of the machinery of the courts. The
evidence as to their use in ancient- judicial proceedings is
meagre. althougfi among the Jews we find satisfactory
records of the use of the oath which has- come to be called
in later times the "decisory oath.r Tfiis is an oath which
under certain prescribe&f conditions may be taken by one
of the parties to the action and which may result in the
decision of the case. hence the phrase "decisory oath."'
There was no provision in jewish law by which withiesses
in criminal ca.kes should be sworn to tell the truth. They
were cautioned and warned of the sin of lying and were
-rigidly cross-examined, but no oath had to be taken.' 7 In
" See generally "Tyler on Oaths:'
"In the Talmutd it is laid down, "If one owes a note to a party and
*the latter said to him, 'Swear to me by your life and I will be satisfied,' according to R. Mair he may retract and according to the sages
he may not." It appears more fully from the explanation followingi
that this was a lccisory oath. The plaintiff having elected to abide by
the oath of the defendant was bound thereby. Rodkinson's Babylonian Talmud, Vol. 7 and 8, p. 68. The use of these.oaths is very
fully explained in a later volume of the same work, ibid. Vol. 9 and
1o, "Tract Shehuoth."
Ve find similar evidence of the use of the
decisory oath in the Old Testament. It is commanded in Exodus that
if a hailce be accused of theft and the thing bailed cannot be found,
the bailee may clear himself by an oath, provided no other witnesses
cai le found. This is a. slight', diffcrtnt form, hut is unmistakably one
kind of decisory oath. Fx. xxii. io,ri. So also in IHebrews vi. 16. it
is said that an oath shall settle all strife between man and man.
AfMendelssofin's Criminal Jur. of Ancient Hebrews, p. Io.
The method of cautioning Jewish witnesses is set forth in Ibid and
also in the Talmud. stipra. pp. 85, 111. The method deemed most
effective was to solemnly remind the witness of the sin of lying and
particut rly of bearing false witness, and in criminal cases that the
blood of the innocent man condemned by false testimony will be upon
the head of the false witness and of his descendants, even unto the
most remote generations.
The method of cross-examlnig is set forth in the Talmud with
particularity, so that a false witness may be detected. See Talmud,
supra,p. .15.
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civil cases, however, witnesses appear to have been sworn.
In the code of Hammurabi there are eleven instances of
decisory oaths and( one
where clearly the witnesses -were
7
required to take oath.1 b
The oath in judicial proceedings iii the early Roman
law was used as a mode of deciding the case, when taken
by one of the parties to the action, but not to bind witnesses to speak the truth. It was strictly an alternative
to evidence, it was not used to add weight to it. The parties

could not voluntarily take a decisory oath,. but only when
tendered by the opposite party or required by the judge,
and the personality of the party was always taken into
account before the entire decision of the question was referred to his single oath. 18 Just when the practice of swearing witnesses originated
in the Roman law is uncertain. Hunter says it began in
the time of Constantine. 9 It is true that witnesses were
sworn as early as that, but whether or not they were sworn
earlier is doubtful. It is certain, however, that from about
the time of Constantine it has been the practice in the
Roman law'to require witnesses to swear that they will tell
the truth.
It is neither possible nor desirable to examine minutely
the use of oaths in the judicial proceedings of other systems
of law. Puffendorf states that oaths have been used in all
countries, although he does not go into detail as to the way
in which they were used. We find a great deal of fragmentary evidence of their use in the Teutonic countries and
in others, but nothing sufficiently authoritative to warrant
any generalizations as to when they were first introduced
into judicial proceedings or the manner of their use in early
times. All that we do know is that the oath as an'instilution
"a In the ninth and tenth
such oaths were required
always.
31b John's translation, §
" A very excellent and

volume of the Talmud, supra, it is shown that
upon some occasions though apparently not

9concise description of this oath is given in
Greenidge's "The Legal Procedure of Cicero's Time," p. 259 ct seq.
See also Hunter's R6nian Law, p. ioo5 et seq.; Rohy's Private Law,
P. 394 et seq.
" Page io6o.
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is and has been world wide and that it is now used in the
judicial proceedings of all countries with but few exceptions.

20

The oath has been a part of judicial proceedings of the
common law from the very dawn of its history. It was used
in connection %vit the older methods of trial, e. g., trial by
battle, trial by witnesses, b i wager of law, by the brdeal,
etc.Some of these modes of trial were introduced at the time
of the Norman conquest. but others were in common use
prior to that time. The trial by wager of law bore a marked
resemblance to the decisory oath and no doubt was a variation of it.22 It is impossible to say when the oath first
formed a part of judicial procedure in English courts. All
that we know is that so far back as the light of modern
research has extended we have found it. It was in use by
the Saxon tribes who came to the island in 449 A. D. and
may have formed a part of the Celtic system of law prior to
that time. Having existed long before the development of
the English jury system, it became an integral part of the
jury trial and by the earliest records both jurors and wit23
nesses were sworn.
The prevailing religion in England at the time when the
common law was slowly rounding into form was, of course,
Christianity. The forms of oath inmost common use there'See

PuffBh~rf. Book IV, C. I1,Tyler on Oaths; articles in .9

Green Bag, 57; I b.,5-, 6 ; V. Sol. Jour. & Rep. 5t; Jenk's Law and
Politics in the Middle Ages, p. 274.
'In the Year Book. 20 and 21 Edw. I. (Horwood Ed.), p. 440 (A. D.
1203) is recorded an oath to be taken hy the viewers in a writ of Novel

Disseisin. ending "So help me God and the Saints." See also lb. 30
and 31. Edw. .. pp. 74. 76, 116,.242; lb. 32 and 33, Edw. I., p. 386; lb.
33 and 35. Edi-. I.. p. 154: 1b. 12 and 13, Edw. Ill.. p. 176.
= See 3 BI. Crm.. C. 22; "Thayeron Ev., C. I ; i Poll. & Mait. go.
' See generally as to the iise of oaths in early times in England.
95; Glanville,
3 M. Com. 342: Wilk. L. L Angl. Sax., C. 3; Co. Litt, -Lib. I. C. 9; Fitz. Abr. Tit. iy. 78. Anonymous, Salk. 683; Thayer on
Ev. 24: Munim. Giih. 1. 217-218. 1 Poll. & Mait. go. 15r, 154; II Ibid.
6o1. 637. 645; 'Mapes. De Nugis. p. 241 : Brunner D. R. G. I1,
384; Lea.
Sup & Force (4th. ed.). 34. 42; Lewis. Anc. Laws of Wales, 3o, 112;
Eng. Conr. (Palgrave) 1. 262-3; Glanville, VITT, 9, Bigelow P1. A. N.
XVIIl; Selden Soc. Pubs. II and IV.
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ftre were uidelled upon the assumption that the swearer
%as a Ch1ristian. They contained an appeal to the Christian
(;od and were ordinarily taken either upon the Holy Scriptures or upon some sacred relic.
How the idea originated thaL only Christian oaths were
of sufficient solemnity to be accepted in English courts, is a
mystery. It was of course due to the spirit of intolerance
which unfortunately seemed to dominate most religious
people of early times. The assumption of the Church, which
then controlled secular affairs, was that all "heathen" were
wholly unfit to be believed. Therefore, among the very
earliest of English comnmentators we find it stated that
jurors and witnesses must be sworn according to the Christian method upon the Holy Scriptures.
Britton says jurors shall be sworn "So help me God and
the Saints," '- 4 and "it was provided on account of people
difficult of belief that oaths should be taken25 upon the Holy
Gospels of God for avoidance of idolatry."
It follows of course that if an oath of this form was the
only one AWhich could legally be taken in an English court,
all persons other that Christians would be disqualified as
witnesses, because even if they would be willing to take
such an oath, it would have no binding effect upon them
owing to their disbelief in the Christian God and their lack*
of reverence for the Holy Writ.
Sir Edward Coke made the first positive statement to this
effect. He says in his Institutes that none but Christians
can he witnesses'in English courts. - At the same place he
- Page 135.

=5o, see also Fleta, supra, Bracton f. n6, Vol IT, p. 24a-41;
Iritton de chal. de Jurors, C. 53, p. 135; Fortescue dc Laud. Leg.
Angliac, C. -6, pp. 54-58, as to supposed essentials of the oath in the

earliest times.
'Lord Coke defines an oath to be an affirmation or dental -by a
Christian. 3 Inst. 165. and he ssys an oath must be accompanied by
the fear (f God (meaning the Christian God), and that an alien infidel
cannot be a witness. 4th Inst. 278. Ile also says the form of the oath
is essential, and can be vatied only by act of Parliament (Ibid.).
See also to the same effect Coke upon Lit., Sec. 6 (b) ; Hale, Pleas of
Crown, Vol. II. p. 279; Ilawkins, Pleas of Crown. title "Evidence";

Calvin's Case, 7 Co. 17 (a), where Lord Coke says infidels are perpetual enemies to Christendom.
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makes the further statement that the form of oath cannot be
varied save by act of Parliament. This would result in
excluding Jews as they would not be sworn upon the New
Testament. As a matter of fact, however, they were admitted even before the authority of Coke's statement -was
finally overthrown.2 7 Lord Cokie, who is said to have been
an ardent hater of Catholics, even went so far as to exclude
popish recusants and all excommunicated persons from being witnesses2 8
The oath having become firmly incorporated into the
machinery of the English courts, it was the theory of the
common law that no witness ought to be allowed to give
evidence unless he did so under the sanctity of an oath, which
was thought to be the strongest possible guarantee of
' See Bark-cr v. Warrell, 2 3..od. 271; Anonymous, z Vern. 263;
Serra v. MunCe,

2 Strange. 821; Robdy v. Langslon; Keble, 314. In
fact the oath of a Jew is said to have been given more weight than that
of a Christian in some proceedings. r5 Seld. Socy. XI, lb. I.
' As to Coke's sentiments toward Catholics, see Johnson's Life of
Coke, Vol. 11, p. 389 ct seq. As to the exclusion of papists, see Afly.
Gen. v. Griffil, 2 Bulstrode, 155, in which lie declared "every recusant
convict is to be excommunicated; and, therefore, in my circuit I do
not admit them for witnesses between party and party, they being no
competent 'witnesses."
ie said further, addressing himself to some
popish recusants before him, "the writ was used De Leproso Amovendo, for fear of infecting of the body, and such writs are now very
requisite to remove you, for you infect the soul, which is much more
dangerous." Although some later writers have sought to excuse Coke
on the ground that he could not be expected to be ahead of his time
(see note by Scott. J., in Perry's Case, 3 Gratt, 632), he was roundly
abused as early as the first half of [he eighteenth century- for his
narr6w intolerance. See remarks of Willes, J., in Omychund -v.
Barker. Willes, 538.
Gilbert on Evidence. p. 261 't. seq., and Buller, N. P. 292 (b), are
al.so authority for the tateinvnt that both excommunicated persons
and popish rectsantis ivere at one lime inadmissible as witnesses.
alhough Phillips set-ms to doubt. See p. i9.note 7. The absurdity of
these rules of excluiou is fully demonstrated by Bentham. He remarks,
**No sooner are you excommunicated than a discovery is made, that
bring 'excluded out of the church' you are 'not under the influence of
any religion.' You are a sort of atheist. To your own weak reason
it appears to you that you believe; but the law, which is the perfection
of reason. knows that you do not. Being ominiscient and infallible and
so forth, she knows that, were you to be. heard, it would be impossible
you should spe;ak true." Vol. V. p. 14o. These disabilities were
removed by 8 Gceo. II, C. 127.
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truth.2 1 It follows that if a man did not possess the necessary qualifications of an oath taker, heretofore mentioned, he would be excluded from the witness stand;
that is, if he did not believe in a supernatural being who
woafd. when called upon, witness the words spokerr and
punish a deviation from the truth. The only essential
was that the witness should relate his evidence under the
sanctity of a belief on his part in some superior power (no
matter what) which was taking note of his words for the

purposes mentioned. Hence, as has already been noticed,
each person was to be sworn according to his own religious
belief. It was not in the least necessary that the belief of
the witness should conform to that of him who administered
the oath.30 There is nothing in its nature, if properly understood, which could have given rise to the error of the early
English law writers. It must be ascribed to a feeling then
prevalent in England that all non-Christians or even nonagreeing Christians were without honor and unworthy of
belief, coupled with the fact that the customary oaths used
in England were Christian oaths.
However the error may have arisen, it was recognized. to

be an error by the great case of Omychund v. Bark&r in
1 7 4.4 ,a' by which all preceding authorities were swept aside.
Opinions were delivered by the Lord Chief Baron. the Lord
Chancellor, Lord Chief Justice Willes and Lord Chief Justice Lee. The precise question was as to th6 admission of
two witnesses who professed the "Gentoo" religion. After
elaborate arguments it was unanimously decided that the
two Gentoos should be swoin after the manner of their own
religion and admitted as witnesses. The authority of Lord
Coke was disregarded, Lord Chief Justice Willes remarking,
"this notion (that non-Christians cannot be sworn), though
advanced by so great a man, is contrary to religion, common
sense and common humanity, and I think the devils them"i Phil. on Ev. z5. Lord Shaftsbury v. Lord Digby. 3 Keble, 63r;
2 Roll. Abr. 686. Note tt, Rex; v. Sutton, 4 M. & S. 532, 537. "
'A rather amusing incident is mentioned in 17 Jr.. L. T. 69: One

Pastor Ilapke refused to be sworn in a -Berlin court until he knew
whethcr the judge who proposed to administer the oath was a Christian.
Since no information on that point was forthcoming he declined to be
sworn, and was fined 3o0 marks.
3t

1 Atkin,

21;

Willes, 538.
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selves to whom he has dedicated them (Jews and nonChristians), could not have suggested anything worse."
The learned Chief Justice further remarked: "I lay no
stress upon the authority of Bracton, Briton and Fleta, for
they lived in popish times when no other trade was carried
on except the trade of 'eligion; and I hope such times will
never come againi."
The principal features of the decision were resolved as
follows:
i. That the oath'is not a Christian institution, but has
existed from the earliest times.
2. That an oath is of binding force when taken by any
person, Christian or infidel, if taken according to the rites of
his own religion.
3. That the form of oath usually administered in English
courts is not essential. but that any persons .may be admitted sworn as above.
4. That this decision does not warrant the admission of
witnesses with no religion. but that such must be excluded,
because an oath cannot possibly have any binding force upon
them, since they believe nothing. =
The .rule in Omvchund Y.Barker has been uniformly followed both in England" and America, so that at common law
infidels may be admitted sworn according to the ceremonies
of their own religion,3 3 hut atheists and those who have no

belief are excluded from testifying."'
' One reason this decisi6n came when it did was divulged by Lord

Chief Justice Willes, when he said he ignored the old commentators,
because they lived in a time when no trade except religion was carried
on. In viiw of England's great and growing commerce with India,
the necessity of admitting people of that country as witnesses was fully
realized.
Woodeson's Lectures, p. r.6; Phillips' Ev. 17; Morgan's Case, i
Leach. C. C. 64; Peake's Evidence. -o6; Facldia v. Sabine, 2 Strange,
1104: Rex v. Entreman, C. & M. 249: Rex v. AIh'ey, 0. B. Sess.

i8o4; Ramikissenscat v. Barker, r-Atkin 59; Athrson v. Everitt, Cowp.
399; B'uller N. P. -92: t Stark on Ev. 22; rdonnnds v. Rowe, Ry. &
'M.77; Miller v. Solomon:$, 7 r~xch. 475; Greenleaf on Ev., see. 366;
Maddox list. of Exch. 166; Wilkins' Saxon Laws. 348; Vail v. Nick-

crs,. 6 Mask. _6z: Cont. v. Buzzcll, t6 Pick. 153 - Newman v. Newman,
7 N. J.Eq. 6; Wlashington v.Gin Pon. x6 Wash. 425; R. v. Pah-MahGay, 20 U. C. 0. B. 195; Donkle v. Kohn, 44 Ga. 266.
"'Bullers N. P. 292, Glib. on Ev. 129; Rushton's Case, t Leach C. C.

EFFECT UPON TIE COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES.

.391

Omychumd v. Barker, having settled the question as to
the admission of "infidels" provided they believe in a god
who will punish them: ifthey speak falsely, a controversy,
as foolish as it was needless, arose as to whether it is necessary for the witness to believe ii a hereafter during which
he will suffer punishment for violating his oath or whether
it is sufficient if he believes a god will punish him in this life.
What Cliief Justice Willes really said in Omychund v.
Barker on this point is somewhat doubtful. In the report
of the case in I Atkins he is made to say, "Though I have
shown that an infidel in general cannot be excluded from
being a witness, and though I am of opinion that infidels
who believe in a God and future rewards and punishments
in tfie other world may be witnesses, yet I am as clearly of
opinion that if they do not believe in a God, or future rewards and punishments, they ought not to be admitted as
witnesses." In Willes's report. however, his language is.
essentially different. He says, "And on the other hand I
am clearly of opinion that such infidels (if any such there be)
who either do not believe in a God, or if they do do not
think that He will either reward or punish them in this world
or in the next, cannot be witnesses." The latter is probably
the correct report. 35
Had it not been for this inaccuracy there would probably
have been no controversy over this point (as is observed in
455; Madc

v. Catanach, 7 II. & N. 36o; I Phillips oil Ev. i9; I Stark
on Ev. 22; I Grccnleaf on Ev., sec.
368; Fernandes v. Henderson, S.
C. Law J. 2o2; Jones v. Harris. I Strohh. i6o; Slate v. Bclton, 24 S. C.
j85; Odell Y. Coppce, 5 Heisk 88: McGuff v. State, 88 Ala. 1S1; BeardsIcy v. Foote, 2 Root, 399; Smtith v. Co'fln, x8 Me.x64; Arnold v. Arnold,
13 Vrt. 362; Scott v. Hooper, 14 V\t. 535; Butts v. SwartIUood, 2 Cow.
431; People v. Matteson, 2 Ibid. 433 IVakcficld v. Ross, &- Mason, S8;
Thurston v. Whitney. 2 Cush. ro4- Com. v. Hills, io Cash. 53o; Dow
v. Parsons.I Root. 480; Cubbison v. McCreary, 2 NV. & S. 262; Blair
v. Seaver, 26 Pa. -74; Corn. v. lrinnernorc, 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 378;
Michner v. Taggart, 8 Haz. Pa. Leg. Reg. 172; Curtiss v. Stern, 4
Urys C. Rep. Si; State Y. Cooper, 2 Tenn. 96; McClure v. State, x
Yerg. 2o6; Hfarrell v. State, I Head, zS; State v. IVashingtoo, 42 L.
R. A. 553.
' Atkins reports .re considered by English judges to be very inaccurate. See comments uon them in La Vie v. Phillips, i W. Bl 57o;
Olive v. Smiih, 5 Taust. 64,
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the case of People v. Matteson)." and those cases inwhich
it was held:" that belief in a "future state" is necessary,
would never have been decided. It is now well-settled that
it is sufficient for the witness to possess belief in a suprenie being who will punish him for violating his oath,
and it is immaterial whether he believes the punishment will
38
be inflicted upon him in this world or in tht world to come.
The final conclusion of the common law, therefore, is
that an unbeliever is incompetent to take an oath because it
cannot have any binding effect upon him, and without the
oath no person can be heard to give evidence, for, unless he
invokes the vengeance of God for false swearing; there is
no security that he will tell the truth.
With the growth of religious toleration, however, it began to dawn upon the legal world that perhaps an unbeliever or even an atheist might on some occasions tell the
truth, and hence their continued exclusion might result in
injury to the cause of innocent suitors who needed their

testimony .39
"a2 Cowen (N. Y.), 433.
See King Y. Taylor, Peake (N. P.), i i; State v. Doherty, 2 Overton. So; Jackson v. Gridley, iS Johns 98; Peake on Ev. 2o6; Atw'ood
%.l'elt-n, 7 Conn. 66; Perry v. Stewart, 2 Harr. 37; Slate v. Towscnd,
Ibid. 543. As to Scotland, see Tiit on Ev. 347.
a Greenleaf on Ev., see. 369; 2 Taylor on Ev., sec. 1384; llunscon V.
Htnseon, 15 Mass. 184; Butts v. Swarlwood, 2 Cow. 431; People V.
Matheson, lb. 433 (note); ltoakefield v. Ross, 5 Mason 18; Cubbison
v. McCreary, 2 W. & S.26z; Blair v. Seaver, _-6 Pa. 274; Central A.
T. R. Co. v.Rockafllot, 17 Ill.
541,; Brock v. Milligan, 1o Ohio 121
(z Wilcox); Clinton v. Slate, 33 Ohio St. 27; U. S. v. Kennedy, 3
McLean0 175; Fernandes v. henderson. S. C. Law J.2oz; Jones v.
Harris. i Strohh. j6o: People v. MeGarren. 17 Wend, 46o; Free v.
IBuckinghant, 59 N. 1. 219; Blocker Y. Burness, 2 Ala. 354; Postis v.
cotney, 3 Ala.. 314;. Shiw v. Moore, 49 N. C. 25; Perry v. CoM., 3
Gratt. 632; Beeson Y. Moore, 31 So. 456; Searey v. Miller, 57 Iowa,
613: Bennett v. State, %Swan. 411; Arnold v. Arnold, 13 Vt. 362; Bell
v. Bell, 34 X. B. 6rt.
' It has ben one of the most difficult problems of the common.law
to decidle ulon the competency of witnesses. Two ends somewhat
inc,,n.istent have to be attained: First: Those persons who will

probably tell the truth should be admitted, and those who will probably
tell false oods, or who are totally unreliable from incapacity to understand or relate, should be excluded (supposing these things to be dis,oover:ble). Second: No persons or class of persons should be excluded
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The first great work which attacked the rule excluding
unbelievers as witnesses. Bentham's Judicial Evidence,

started an agitation of the subject in England which never
ceased until it bore fruit in the entire abolition by statute
of all defects arising from religious belief or the lack of it,
in that country and most of its colonies. 0
from testifying if their testimony m.y at some time be necessary to the
proper administration of- justice. unless it be reasonably sure that it

will in all cases be unworthy of belief. In early times the first of these
principles seems to have been given much more weight than the second.
The law was very jealous of the character of witnesses. Thus those
persons were excluded:
x. Who had any pecuniary interest however small in the subject
matter of the controversy, they being thought ntore likely to regard this
interest than temporal or divine punishment for perjury.
2. Who having been -convicted of certain crimes were deemed "infamous" and unfit to be believed.
3: Who were defective in religious belief, and so could not be moved
by fear of divine punishment.
4. Who by reason of infancy or mental weakness were unreliable, and
unable to relate intelligently that which they had seen and heard.
The English Parliament and the American legislatures have reaized
that the exclusion of witnesses merely by reason of their having an
interest in the decision of the controversy was a mistake, and sic
disability has been removed by statute. In England Lord 3ennan's
Act, 6 and 7 Vict., C. 8s. removed entirely the disability of interet,
except as to parties to the action, reciting that it was thought better to
hear all that such persons had to say, trusting the jury to judge of
their credibility. The disability of the parties was finally abolished also
by 14 and x5 Vict., C. 99. For a statement of the reasons formerly
supposed to be at the bottom of this rule, see Gilbert on Ev. 72
The rule is now substantially the same all over the United State&
See note to z Greenleaf on Evidence, Lewis' edition, p. 673, sec. 430.
The same may be said of England and of most American states with
respect to the disqualification for conviction of crime, the fact of such
conviction now going only to the credibility of the- witness.

'Lord

Denman's Act, supra, absolutely sweeps away all disability for convic.
tion of crime. The American states have in many instances done away
with it entirely in a similar manner, but others have merely cut down
the list of crimes, making usually a conviction of, perjury and sometimes
of forgery a disqualification. See note to i Greenleaf on Evidence,
Lewis' edition, p. 5o, sec. 372.
The class incopipetent by reason of defective understanding is very
generally excluded at the prisent day for the same reason, although
some changes have -heen hrought about as to the proper test of a
sumcient understanding. which will he commented upon later.
' Of all the articles written on the subject I have seen but one which.
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None of these statutory changes had been accomplished
by the British Parliament at the time of the American Revolution, hence the competency of -, itnesses in this country
is at common law e.xcept in so .far as it has been altered by
-legislative action in the different states. Such action, in
spite of our fancied greater share of religious liberty, has
favors the exclision of atheisis, an article by S. G. in 1-2 Law
Reporter, 345. Among those which take the opposite view are, Bentham
on Judicial Evidence, Book ,Chap. 6;_"Judicial Oaths," by F. S. Reilly,
in i Jur. Soc'y Papers, 435; paper entitled "Ought any person to be
excluded from- giving evidence'off the ground of Riligious Unbelief?"
by.Rev. F. D. Maurice, III Ibid. 95; "Judicial Oaths as administered to
'Heathen Witnesses," by T. C. Anstey, Ibid. 371 ; 23 C. L. J. 5o (Ed.);
4 Am. Jur. 286; "Ought atheists to be received as cempetent witnesses?" is Law Reporter, 3ox.
The first step taken by the British Parliament. toward the admission
of atheists was the act of 6 and 7 Vict., C. 22, -which authorized the
legislatures of the colonies to pass laws to admit unsworn testimony.
for the ieason that here were, particularly in India, many persons who
not only had no religious scruples against lying under oath, but whose
'religion in tome cases commanded them to lie. Next in order came
the sct 6f 32 and 33 Vict., .C.68, 9ec- 4, which provided that "If any
person called to give e.idence in any court of justice, whethir in i civil
or criminal proceeding, shall object to take an oath, of' shall be objected
to as inico'mpetent to take an oath, such person shall, if the presiding
judge is satisfied that the taking'of an bath would have no binding
effect on his conscieice, make the following promise and declaration:
"'I solemnly promise and declare that the -evidence given by me to

the court shall be the truth, the whole truth and n'thing btk the.
truth.'"
Some doubts having arisert with respect to the interpretation of this •
act, it was superseded by 5t and a Viet.; C. 46, in the following
language:
"Sec. 2. Every person upon objecting to-beink sworn, and stating, as
the ground of such objection, either thit he has no religious belief or
that the taking of an oath is contrary to his religious belief, shall be
permitted to make his solemn affirmation instead of taking an oath in
all places and -for all purposes where an oath is- or shall be required by
law, which affirmation shall be of the same force and effect as if he had
taken the oath; and if any erson making such affirmation shall wilfully,
falsely and corruptly affirm any mitter or thing which; if deposed on
oath, would have amotinted to wilful and corrupt perjury, he shall be
liable to prosecution, indictment.- sentence and punishment in all
respects as if he had- committed wilful and corrupt perjury.
"Sec. 3. Where an oath has been duly administered and taken, the
fact that the person to whom the same was administered had, at the

EFFECT UPON THE COMPETENCY OF WITNESSE.

395

not been so spontaneous nor so complete as in England. In
thirty-three states and territories atheists or unbelievers have
been made competent witnesses. The same is probably true
of three others, but in fourteen and probably fifteen the comrmon law rule is still unchanged 4 1 .
time of taking such oath, no religious belief, shall not for any purpose
affect the validity of such oath."
Substantially the same rules now exist in India. Chap. IX, p. xis,
of the Anglo-Indian Codes, Vol. II, admits all persons to be witnesses
who are.capable of relating intelligently tlose things which they have
seen and heard. No general act has abolished the incompetency arising
from religious unbelief in Canada, according to the construction of the
Canada Evidence Act (56 Vict., C. 31). Bell v. Bell, 34 N. B. Rep. 6z&
but some of the territorial legislatures have done so. Ontario has,
see Practical Statutes, p. 78.
' The citation in detail of the statutes and constitutions 'of all the
states and territories is so extensive that for covenience the statutory
and constitutional rules on this and kindred subj-cts are classified and
topographically arranged in an appendix at the end. The statutory
changes, however, tiaturally fall into groups, which are here given
together with their construction by the courts of the different states.
Ten states and one territory, viz: ARIZONA, CoNzcrlcuT, FlcmnkA
INDIANA, MAINE, MAssAcHUsrrr
MIssIssIPP, NEw MIxIon, TINNEssEE, TEXAS and UTAH have laws which expressly admit persons as

witnesses who have no religions belief. The methods of-expressing the
change in the law vary, but all have for their purpose the abolition of
the common-law rule, that one who has no belief in the existence
of a God who will punish for false swearing cannot testify. Thus the
ARtzoNA code provides, "no person shall be incompetent to testify on
account of his religious opinions, or for want of any religious lelieL"
Code of Crim. Proc., sec. I og, Rev. Stats, p. 1373. The general statutes
of CoNNEcricuT provide, "No person shall be disqualified as a witness
*

.

by reason

. .

. of his disbelief in the existence of a Supreme

Being." See. 1og.
Twenty-four states and territories, viz: A.ASxA, AxxANSAS, CAL.FOaxNA, COLORADo,-GEoRGtA, IDAHO, INDIAN Tnrroy, IowA, KAiSAS,
MARYLAND, MICHIGAN, MixzSOA, MsSOURi, MoNTANA, NURAsrA
NEVADA, Nnw Yosx, NOR=H DAKOTA, OII,.'OuoN, VERMONT, WAsmINGroN, WISCONSIN, WYOMING (see appendix) provide that no person

shall be incompetent as a witness by reison of "his opinions on religious
matters" or on account of ."his religious belief," etc. These provisions
are contained sometimes in constitutions and sometimes in statutes.
They are very generally construed to mean that no person can.be
rejected as a witness either because of the character of his belief (which
would be merely declaratory of the common law) or because'he has

none.
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While, therefore, the tendency of modem legislation is to
abolish the religious test for the competency of witnesses,
there is yet a considerable portion of the United States where
an unbeliever cannot testify. If we suggest the propriety
of statutory alterations of the law in this respect, the burden
This is the rule in

CALIFORNIxA: Fuller v.

Fuller, x7 Cal. 6o5; People

v. Sanford. 43 Cal. 29; People v. Chin Mook Sow, St Cal. 59g; People
v. Copsey, 71 Cal. 548. GEoaIA: Donkle v. Kohn, 44*Ga. 266 (dictum).
IowA: State v. Elliot, 45 Iowa, 486; Searcy v. Miller, 57 Iowa, 6r3.
KANss: Dickinson v. Beal, 6z Pac. 724. M1cnxcGm: People v. Jenness,
5 Mich. 305. MiNxEsoTA: State v. Levy, 23 Minn. 1o4 (dictum). MiSsouRi= Londoner v. Lichtenhcim, ii Mo. App. 385; Cadmu.s v. St.
Louis Bridge and Tunnel Co., IS Mo. App. 86. NEw Yom=: People v.
McGarren, 17 Wend. 46o; Stanbro v. Hopkins, 28 Barb. a65.
It will undoubtedly be the rule in COLORADO, IDAHO, MONTANA,
VlscovsIx and WYomrxG, as these
NEvAvA, OREGON, WASHINGTON,
states all have statutes so worded as to admit witnesses who have no

religious belief. See appendih .
. In AL.sxA and VEmMOxr the same result will also undoubtedly follow, as there are in these states express statutes forbidding all inquiry
into the religious belief of witnesse;. See appendix. It is more than
probable that the courts of NoRTH DAKOTA will also admit atheists
under their statutory rules so soon as the question is brought before
them.
In OHIo, however, a different construction has been adopted. The
constitution of that state provides, "Nor shall any person be incompetent to be a witness on accoumnt of his religious belief" The court in
Clinton v. The State, 33 Ohio, St. 27, decided that these words did not
remove the incompetency arising from lack of religious belief, but were
merely declaratory of the common law. The position assumed was that
inasmuch as oaths were not abolished, witnesses were bound to be
sworn or affirmed in the manner most binding on their consciences, and
that one ig not capable of taking an oath or affirmation unless he have
a religious belief. This decision, which is a very narrow one, proceeded
on. the ground that under the Ohio statutes, which allow only those
having conscientious scruples to affirm, one is incapable of talcing an
affirmation unless he be a believer. This is'not the law in other states
in which atheists may testify, as in them oaths and affirmations have
not been abolished. In a number of them, however, an affirmation may
be taken at the option of the witness, irrespective of any conscientious
scruples. See appendix.
In the remaining three states and territories, viz: ARKANSAS, INDIAN
TERmiToRY and MARYLAND, of the list last given there are expiess constitutional provisions that one who "denies the being of a God,." as in

ARKA N AS and INDIAN TERRITORY (both have the same constitution),
or who does not believe in a Supreme Being who will punish for false
swearing, as in MARYLAND, cannot be a witness.

See appendix.

EFFECT UPON THE COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES.

397

is t1tQfl us to show either that the common law rule was

founded upon a misconception or that it has outlived its
usefulness.
Tf the atheist or unbeliever is to be admitted it will miean
the abandonment of the oath as to him. Ie will assume
In eight other states,. viz: ALt-nA.MA, ILLIN-OIS, KENTUCKY, NEW
JERSEY, RHODE ISLAND, SOUTH DAKOTA, VIRGINIA and WEST VIRGINIA

(see appendix), there are general provisions, either statutory or constitutional, to the effect that one's civil rights shall be in no way affected
by his religious "belief," "principles" or "opinions on religious matters."
In N~w JERSEY a provision that "no person shall be denied any civil
right merely on account of his religious principles," is construed not to
admit persons who at common law were, by reason of lack of religious
"principles" or belief, incompetent as witnesses. Donnelly v. State, 2
Dutcher, 6m1; State v. Powers, 5 N. J. L 432.
In ALi.n..A similar phraseology is used, i. e., one's civil rights not
affected by "religious principles." There is no positive decision since
this constitutional clause was adopted in 1375, but a recent case,.Bceson
v. Moore, 31 South, 456, i9o, in admitting a witness who believed in
God but not in a future- state, seemed to lean toward the NEW JERSEY
view, which will probably be followed.
In ROnDE ISLAND, VIRGINIA and WEST VIGiNta the phraseology

used is that civil riglts shall not be affected by "opinions on matters
of religion." This provision has been construed in VIRGINIA to abolish
all religious tests of the competency of witnesses. Perry's case, 3
Gratt, 632.
In WEST VIRGINIA the opposite construction would seem to have
been adopted from the remarks of the court in the ca se of State v.
Michael, 37 W. Va. s65, where the test of the admissibility of a child
was said to be his religious education and belief. There is no decision
as to adult witnesses. In RHoDE ISLAND there are no decis'ons.
In ILLxois and SouTH DAKOTA the provisions are the same except
that the phrase, "religious opinions," is used instead of "opinions on
matters of religion." In ILLINOIS the construction that all religious
tests are abolished by this provision has been adopted. Hronek v. Peo-"
Pie, T34 I1. 139; Eiwing v. Baily, 36 Ill. App. i9T; McAmore v. Wiley,
49 IlL App. 615; People v. Martel, 20 Am. L Rev. 95.
There are no decisions in SOUTH DAKOTA, hut a dictum in State v.
Reddington. 7 S. D. 368, at p. 376, follows the ILLNOIS rule, and it will
in all probability be adopted.
In KENTI'CKY a provision that civil rights shall not be affected by

"belief or disbelief of any religious tenet, dogma or teachins" has been
held to abolish all religious tests of the competency or credibility of
the witness. Bush v. Ky., So Ky. 244. The remarks on this point, however, were dicta, as a provision of the civil code was deemed broad
enough to admit the witness in the absence of any constitutional provision.
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one of two positions. Either he will decline to be sworn in
the name of the Deity in which he has no belief, or he will
consent to perform the ceremony but with no faith in its
efficacy. In either case the religious sanctity of the oath is
absent. The proposition to admit the atheist therefore inThe remaining states and territories. with a possible doubt as to
PE-NxSYLXTA,.,. still enforce the common-law rule as laid down in
Omnychund v. Barker. These states are DELAWAjE: Perry v. Stewart,
2 Harr, 37: State v. Townsend, Abid. 543; HAwAII (except as to young
children old enough to understand but without knowledge of the meaning of an oath. who may testify on treir affirmation. (See appendix) ;
LoCISI.NXA: State v. Washington, 42 L. IL A. 553; NEw HAMPSHME:
Morton v.Ladd, 4 N. H. 444; Free v.Buckingham, 59 N. H. 219; NORtTH
C. 25; OKLATONIA, FENXSYLVAIA
CAROLINA: Shaw v. Moore, 49
(see infra). SOUTH CAROLINA: Fernandes v. Henderson, S. C. Law
Jour. 2o; Jones v. Harris, I Strobh, i6o; State v. Bellon, 24 S. C. 185.
In PEx-SYLVANA some question has been raised whether a recent
statute enlarging the competency of witneses has not opened the door
for the admission of the testimony of atheists and agnostics. This contention that unbelievers are now competent in Pennsylvania is based
upon the terms of the act cf May -3.n9,37, P. L 158, which provides as
to the competency of witnesses in criminal cases "except [certain cases
enumerated in this act] all persons shall be fully competent witnesses
in any criminal proceeding before any tribunal," and as to civil cases,
"No . . . interest or policy of law except as is provided in Section
S of this act. shall make any person incompetent as a witness." No
exception of persons lacking religious belief is made; therefore, it is
said, they are competent.
I should be very glad if I could think this act really has the effect

claimed for it, but I am compelled to take the opposite view for the
following reasons:
r. There is no dispute that prior to the passage of this .act it was
necessary in Pennsylvania for all witnesses to have a belief in a
Supreme God, who will punish for false swearing either in this world
or in the next. Quinn v. Crowll, 4 Whart. 334; Cubbison v. McCreary,
2 IV. & S. ,62; McFadden v. Coin., 23 Pa. i2; Blair v. Sea'er, 6 Pa.
274; Con. v. l'inneinore,2 Brewst. 378.
. There is"no express reference to the snbject'of religious belief
in the act, and since, if it has the effect claimed it will abolish a rule of
common law. it must be construed so as to be consistent with the common law, if this is at ill possible. Er.lich on Interpretation of Statutes, Secs. 127. 128, and cases there cited. 3. There are two possible constructions which may be put upon the
words of this act. First, they may be taken irs their actual and literal
sense to admit all persons not expressly excluded. Second, they may
he construed merely to destroy certain. incapacities at which the act
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volves the question whether it is better for the interests of
justice to exclude him because he cannot take .the oath or
admit hini without that security. This does not involve the
broad question as to the value of oaths in general; that is
reserved for a later part of this paper.
was obviously aimed and among which religious unbelief was admittedly
not included.
If one of these constructions be adopted, we must apply it to all
classes of persons incompetent at common law for any reason whatsoever. We cannot apply one construction to some classes whom we
desire to admit and the other to some whom we are (for reasons that are
plain to everyone) obliged to exclude. It becomes at once apparent that
we are compelled to adopt the second construction and interpret the act
to destroy only those incapacities at which it was obviously aimed (see
the pamphlet explaining the purpose of the act by, its draftsman, Hon.
John B. McPherson) and which are specifically dealt with by its terms,
but that it does not destroy the fundamental grounds.of incompetency
which rendered a man incapable of being a witness bcause, judged by
the standard of the common law,.he was unable to take an oath. The

common-law capacity to take an oath consists of (i) understanding,
(2) belief. If either is lacking the witnesa is excluded. Now if this
act is taken literally to admit all persons not excluded, it must admit
not only atheists and agnostics, but also children too young to understand the meaning of in.
oath and insane persons, for they also are not
excluded from its terms. It will not do to say that one at common law
incapable of taking an oath because of the lack of one element, viz:
religious belief, is admitted by the general terms of this act, and one
likewise incapable for want of the other element, viz: understanding,

is still excluded.
There are many acts in various states which do have the effect claimed
for this one, but they are all drawn so as to expressly exclude allpersons whose understanding is too limited to enable them to perceive and
to relate their perceptions accurately and truly. Thus the very admirably drawn law of Oregon provides:
"All persons without exceptio, except as otherwise provided in this
title, .who having organs of sense can perceive, and perceiving can
make known their perception.4 to others, may be witnesses."

Among the exceptions we find:

"s. Those of unsound mind at the time of their production for
examinatibn.
"2. Children under ten years of age, who appear incapable.of receiving just impressions of the facts respecting which they. are examined
or of relating them truly." Hill's Annotated Laws of Oregon, Sees.
710. 71. See also other similar statutes cited in appendix.
The argument heretofore has applied equally to witnesses in both
criminal and civil cases. The fourth contention applies only to witnesses
in civil cases.
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Any capable witness will ordinarily tell the truth. The
influences which combine to. lead him to do so may be said
to be three.
I. Natural -indolence.
It is always easier to tell the truth than a lie. This is evi4- Section 4 of the act relating to witnesses in civil cases contains
no general words- aking all persons competent. but purports to destroy
all incompetency arising from "interest or policy of law." Can it bi
said upon a reasonable interpretation of these words that the clause
dcstroying all incompetency arising from "policy of law" shall be taken
to destroy that incompetency which at common law was thought to lie
at the very basis of the law of evidence-that which was .deemed to
render a man incapable of subscribing to an oath and wholly unworthyof belief? Under the usual rules of interpretation of statutes in derogation of the common law this view is inadmissible. That -the act cannot
haie such an effect is of course much clearer whetr we remember the
first reason advanced, jupra, i. e., if incompetency, arising front
religious belif is abolished, so- is that arising from defective understanding.
Moreover judicial authority is against tire positi-on assumed. In
Tioga County v. Soxth. Crcek Tp., 75 Pa. 433, it was contended that
precisely this saine expression as used in the act of April tS, i8f6, P. L.
3o, rendered a wife a competent witness to prcve non-access of her
husband. Mr. Justice Gordon delivered the opinion of'the court, in the
course of which he said:
nBut
the counsel for the appellant insists that the case is within the
purview of the act of i869. The language of that act at first blush might
seem to include a case of this kind. 'No interest or policy of law shall
exclude a party or person from being a witness in any civil proceeding.'
The words we have italicised are those relied upon to support the
appellant's theory. But -when we come to consider the fact that 'the
interest or policy of law' which the legislature had in view in passing
that act was that which, before that time, excluded parties from testifying in their own suits, or where they had an interest in the subject
matter in controversy, it becomes obvious that a case, such as the one
under discussion. i s not- in the legislative mind when the act was
pa.sed. It would, therefore, lie an unnecessary and violent construction
of the statute to wake it include a 'policy of law' wholly different from
that under contemplation when it was framed. We, therefore, without
hesitation, adopt the view taken of this question by the learucd judge
of the Court of Quarter Sessions, and agree with him that the act of
1869 wa. not intended to abolish a valuable rule of law founded in
gou ntoratz and public decency." See p. 437.
The snme rule was re-affirmned in jane's Estate, x47 Pa. 527, which
was decided after the passage of the act of 1887.
If "policy of- law" does not have reference to a rule excluding a wife
as a witness to prove non-acces% it .vould be quite unreasonable to-
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dent because the memory only is exercised in relating a
thing as it really happened, whereas otherwise the creative
imagination must be used. while the memory-must prompt
the witness so that he weave not a "tangled web." '
contend that it includes that relating to incompetency arising from
defect of religious belief-a rule thought at common law t6 be much
more fundamental than the other. See also Bank of Harrisburgv.
Rhoads, 89 Pa. 353, at p. 356, where Mr. Justice Sterrett remarks,
"All witnesses are now primna facie competent -o far as interest and
policy of the law are concerned," showing that he did not think the act
admitted all witnesses not expressly excluded. The argument of counsel
to the effect that "policy of law" had reference to that class of witnesses hitherto excluded not by reason of a direct interest, but on
account of mercantile policy resulting from interest, was apparently
adopted by the court. See also Karns v. Tanner, 66 Pa. 297.
In Com. v. Kaufman, 1 Pa. C. C. 410, there is a diclum by Latimer, J.,
to the effect that an ordinary Witness would be excluded by defect in.
religious belief, althougli in the case before him the defendant, he said,
shonld be admitted. Parties to the action have long been admitted at
common law irrespective of their belief. See Hronek v. People, z34
Il. 1?9; Appleton on Ev., p. 28; 1 Greenleaf on Ev., See. 370, note;
Searry v. Miller, 57 Iowa, 6-x; Dyer v. Dyer, 87 Ind. 20; Free v. Buckinghlam, 5g N. H. 226; Donelley v. Slate, 2 Dutch. 5o6; Stanbro v.
Hopkins, 28 Barb. 268.
Finally*Judge Briggs, in Lncas v. Piper,40 L I. 5, has decided that
since the act of 1869. containing the identical language of the -act of
1887 on this point, witnesses in civil cases are still incompetent if they
do not believe in a God who will punish for false swearing.
If Clinton v. State, 33 Ohio St. 27, supra, be accepted as authority,
it could be said further that inasmuch as only those persons who hiave
conscientious scruples against swearing are allowed to affirm in Pennsylvania (acts of 17x8, '1 Sm. L ion, and 1772, Ibid. 387) atheists or
unbelievers cannot testify in any event, since they cannot take either
oath or affirmation ev'en if otherwise competent. I do not subscribe to
the narrow view of that court however. To say that an unbeliever
cannot affirm in Pennsylvania, if otherwise competent, would be to
declare that he is incapable of having conscientious scruples against a
reference to a deity :n which he does not believe-a position which I
am riot prepared to assume.
In Porto Rico and the Philippine Islands it seems that religious unbelief does not disqualify a witness, although all are required to be sworn.
See as to these points Sundry Laws, Vol. II, p. 162; Civil Procedure, "
p. 137."1See Bentham's Judicial Evidence, VoL 1, Ci. XI, p. 205 et seq.,
where this idea is elaborately worked out. See also generally as to
this topic Best on Evidence, p. 8 ef seq. (ninth ed.).
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2. Fear of disgrace.
From the earliest times truth has been veiieratd and lying
despised. Particularly does infany attach to him who tells
that which he knows to be false, upon a solemn occasion
when the rights of others depend upon his words.
3. Religious belief coupled with fear of punishment by a
divine agency. Practically all religions teach that men will

suffer divine punishment for lyng.4
On the other hand, there may be many influences more
concrete which tend to lead a witness to distort or conceal
the truth or to create fabrications. These influences arise
from motives which may.be present in any particular casemotives of interest, pecuniary or otherwise, fear, love, hate,
sympathy and others which it is unnecessary to enumerate.
In order to accentuate the tendency to tell the truth, until
in ordinary minds it would overbalance any contrary tendencv. two artificial restraints upon the propensity of a witness to prevaricate were made use of by the common law:
I.The institution of the bath.
2. Temporal punishmnenf for perjury.
The first, as we know, appealed to his fears of divine vengeance for' the blasphemy connected with a false oath and
the second appeated to his -fears of human punishment. The
prospect of the latter may of course influence all witnesses,
that of the former those only who believe in it. The precise question. therefore, raised by a pioposition to admit-unbelievers, is whether the absence of the one artificial restraint
of the oath will render the -evidence so unrliable that it
should be rejected altogether, although all the other influences toward trutIr-telling be .present.
It isthe p1'licy of the law to obtari all the light possible
upon. the qdustion of fact before the court and jury. No
evidence shitld be excluded unless it is reasonably- certain
-that it will be wholly unrelihble- or insidionsly deceptive.
'It is said thit'thc' Hindoo code alone santiims lying in certaikispreified izstances. - flentham at -vidvni-, 235-Halheads Code of
Gentoo Laws. 11M. 4. C. 3. See. 9 Thus one may lie to free himself
except. L-sIkntham remarks, where he has committeff a crime of "partictlar atrrcity." .uch as murdering a cow or drinking wine. Ilalhead's
13o. One miy alsotell three lies for the
Code of Grtt. L-aw,. pp. 1:21%

pnrpoe of prvcurring for himself a wife. Ibid.
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Even though it may be distrusted, it should -be received and
-lie jury should judge of its credibility. A serious injury
is done to the administration of justice whenever any evidence which is at all reliable is rejected. It is evident therefore that if the lack of the religious sanction is proper in any
case to be shown, such lack should go only to the credibility
and not to the conipzt.ncy of the witness. To adopt a contrary idea is to say in effect that an unbeliever is an infamous
monster, who seeks to maliciously deceive upon all occasions
for no reason except a wicked desire to do wrong.
I suppose no one will at this day subscribe td so cruel
and unchristian a doctrine, especially when we reflect that
unbelief is not the result of a wicked heart, but is merely a
falure to understand or appreciate the evidence of the existis more faith in honest
ence of an eternal God. "There
'44
doubt than in half the creeds."
The assumption that unbelievers are wholly unreliable is
of course entirely false, as everybody knows. Many of
the most eminent scieitists of the last century would, under
the common law, be incapable of being witnesses. To say
that Darwin, Huxley. Tyndall and many others who could
not avow a belief in God, were entirely unworthy of credit
is mere nonsense.
If the witness, be he atheist or pretended Christian, is an
infamous person, who has led a life so wicked as to render
him unworthy of credence, the evidence of this, equally in
both cases, can of course go to the jury for the purpose of
destroying the effect of his words. Whether ot not an
individual will tell the truth depends far more on his personality. his good character, his moral education, etc., than
upon his belief. Some men will under no circumstances
tell a lie. others will on all occasions where their interest
prompts them to do so, and neither human nor divine sanc"1The judges of earlier times, however, were quite of the other
opinion. Lord Chief Justice Willes said atheists should be excluded
"because an oath cannot possibly be any tie or obligation upba them.*
Ontychund v. Barker, Willes, 53R, and in Norton v. Ladd, 4 N. H. 444,
the cotort said. "He who openly and deliberately avows that he has no
belief in the existence of a God, furnishes clear and satisfactory evidence
again't himself that he is incapable of being bound, by any religious tie,
to speak the truth, and is unworthy of any credit in a court of justice."
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tion will stop them. If the charge of unbelief be allowed
at all, surely it should be but one element tending to show
that the evidence- received ought not to be given undue
weight by the jury, and never to exclude the person from the
witness stand..
There are certain other serious objections to the rule exeluding atheists. It places in the power of an unwilling
Witness, who wishes to save his fellow-criminal and is yet
unwilling to incur the penalties of perjury or to r-n the
risk of cross--examination, a method by which he can disqualify himself. All fie has to do is to avow his unbelief,
or pretend unbelief if he believes, and thething is done, his
evidence cannot be received.45 This is not an improbable
supposition. Cases have occasionally happened where
women have married accused persons to avoid testifying
against them.
Moreover, the continued exclusion of atheists and unbelievers is grossly inconsistent with the later development of
the law. It has already been remarked that religious unbelief is only one of several disqualifications Which existed
at common law-among which were pecuniary interest in
the decision of the controversy and conviction of an infamous crime. The first of these has been totally destroyed
and the, second nearly so by modern legislation. 48 . At the
present time, therefore, in a large portion of America a condenned murderer or a man of known evil character whose
interest will be vitally affected by his evidence may testify,
while an athist, although educated, refined, of spotless integrity and, the highest character, cannot. This is an
anomaly wvhich should not be allowed longer to exist.
But the most fundamental objection is that the rule entirely fails to do that wvhich it intends, and excludes atheists
or unbelievers only under circumstances which belies and
disproves the assumption that their word is-unreliable.
Whether or not a man believes-in the existence of. a God
who Will punish him for false swearing is a psychological
*See BenthaA on Evidence, Vol. V, P. 131; Appleton on Ev., C- II,
where this and various other arguments against the exclusion of atheists

are developed.
'See supra.
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fact-it is -astate or condition of his'mind. How shall we
discover what that condition is? There is oniy one human
being who can possibly know, viz: the man himself. Shall'
we ask him ? Surely not, for we suspect he may be an
unbeliever, and if indeed lie declare himself to be, will thisnot raise a presumption that lie is deceiving us and secretly
believes while alleging his- unbelief? And -if, therefore
because we think le speaks falsely when lie says lie believes
not, shall we not admit him on the theory that in fact he
does believe? In which case lie has already proven himself
a liar and unworthy of credence. This sounds like foolish
sophistry, but if we seriously examine into the matter it is
no more foolish than the rule itself.
Your knowledge of the state of your brother's mind must
come from him-there is no other way. You may learn of
it from his present declarations to you or from his past
declarations, either oral or written. When, therefore, a
man is offered as a witness, how shall we show to the court
that he is "utterly unworthy of belief"? AVe must show
that either in the past, or now before the court, he says *and
says truly that lie believcs not. There are, therefore, two
ways that may be resorted to: First, produce witnesses who
in the past have heard the suspected atheist declare his .disbelief in God; second, interrogate the man himself on his
voir dire.
Evidence of the first kind is unsatisfactory for several
reasons and indeed seems wholly irrelevant. It is unsatisfactory because at best it is but hearsay, declarations which
cannot he said to-be against interest made not upon a judicial
occasion, but perhaps during a frivolous and loose conversation.

Thus in M7Fadden V. Co11.,47 the- evidence was

that the man whose religious belief was questioned had on a
previous occasion "in quarreling with his fellow-jurors"
said that lie "did not care for the Bible any. more than for a
spelling book" and that lie was "a Tom Paine .man and
would as lief swear on a spelling book as on a Bible." In
Brock v. Milliginz4 . it was testified that the witness accused

of unbelief had in a casual conversation, about three-years
befo re, stated that "a man was like the beast : had nothing to
41

23 Pa.

12.

"to Ohio, mr.
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do after death: and that after that period there would be
nothing more of him."
The character of such evidence as this is very questionablein any event. The statements may have been made under
circumstances of peculiar provocation, as in fcFaddcn v.
Cont., where after a long, tiresomre dispute a juryman made
some impious remarks. Any man of a not very reverent
nature is apt sometimes to make unthinking remarks which
when repeated from memory by a hearer may disqualify
him as a witness. As was remarked in Easterday v. Kilborn,
"You take a man's loose declarations and introduce them
against him, without assurance that those who give them
do not think as he does, and then adjudge that he is incompetent to testify, although you believe he will tell the
truth,
49
and would confide in him as soon as iq any man."1

Moreover, is not such evidence 'irrelevant? What is the
question at issue? It is whether the proposed witness nrow,
at this moment, believes in the existence of a God who will
punish him if he violates his oath. Whether, should he be
admitted ,'w as a witness, he could feel the influence of the
religious sanction. The question is not whether 'he made
impious and blasphemous remarks at some time in the past,
nor whether in fact lie was at one time a pronounced atheist.
The inquiry must be confined to the present state of his
mind. It may be said that the fact that the person tinder
examination was an avowed atheist a year or two ago is
evidence that he is nQw. This argument at first thought
appeals to one's reason, but its soundness is questionable.
It depends tipon the assuml)tion 'of consistency. "With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do. . . .Speak
what you think now in hard words and to-morrow speak
what to-morrow thinks in hard words again, though it contradict everything you said to-day."5 0 Even if the previous
51
declarations were made only a short time before the trial,
this would prove nothing. There is no reason why, one's
belief may not be changed in the twinkling of an eye by the
observation of some fact never before noticed or perhaps by
Emerson, E~say. on Self-Reliance.
"Wright, 345.
'frn Brock v.'Milligair, stipra, the witness's declarations were made
three years before. In Blair v. Scarcr,26 Pa 274, two years belore, etc.
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giving serions thought to the matter for the first time, as
52
seemed to be the case in State v. Towtseud.
Whether the testimony of other persons as to what the
proposed witness has said in the past be relevant or not, it
is a very low grade of evidence indeed and cannot stand
against the positiv-e declarations of the witness himself,
which constitute after all the only direct evidence of the
state of his mind that it is possible to get. It has, therefore,

come to be recognized that the proper way to ascertain
the witness's belief is to interrogate him on his voir dire. If
he avow his unbelief, he is to be excluded 1 if he deny it, he
must be admitted- even Ehough there may be extrinsic evidence tending to show unbelief in the past. There is not
entire unanimity on this point, but the great weight of
authority is in favor of the law as stated. The English
cases all say interrogation of the witness is the only proper
way to find out his belief. 3 The English text-writers also
take the same view,5 4 and one Phillips,;" says that the only
way is to ascertain it from the witness himself. On the
other hand. some of the American cases have fallen into
the error of deciding that the fact is to be proven by extrinsic
evidence only, and that the proposed witness will not be
allowed to contradict or exp!ain his previous declarations.
The absurdity of this view is apparent when we consider
that the statement now made by the witness that he believes,
is no contradiction of the testimony of the other witnesses.
He may not deny that he made the statements attributed
92 Harr. 543. The court here, however, refused to consider the
witness's statements at all, apparently assuming that the testimony of
other witnesses who had heard loose declarations of his in the past,
conclusively proved that he did not believe, no matter how much he
might protest that he did.
"The Queen's Case, 2 B. & B. 284; King v. Taylor, Peake i; King
v. White, Leach C. L 430; King v. Serra, 2 C. & K. 56; Mfaden-v.

Catanach, 7 H. & N. 36o

541 Stark on Ev. 93; Gresley's Eq. Ev. 3&2, n. (c); Bentham on Ev.,
" Page 20.
p. 127 ct seq.; Best on Ev., Sec. 161.
. "State v. Townsend, 2 Harr. 543; Curtis v. Strong, 4
Day, 5i; Jacksonv. Gridley, 18 Johns, 98; Brock v. Milligan, 1o Ohio, 126; Com. v.
Smith, 2 Gray, 516, Smith v. Coffin, 6 Shep. 157; Odell v. Hopper, 5
Heisk, 88; Scarcy v. Miller, 57 Iowa, 6zi ; Com. v. Wynman, Thacher
C. C. 432;- CoM. v. Burke, 16 Gray, 33.
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to him, all that he denies is that a doubtful presumption
that he at some former time disbelieved cannot affect his
te.-timony now because it no longer exists. Therefore reduced to its lowest terms all that the witness denies in averring his belief, is the presumption that another presumption still existsPT
Later American cases, however, evidently realizing the
incongruity of refusing to hear the witness as to a point
neither affirmed nor denied, have very generally allowed the
suspected unbeliever to be heard.

8

Black, C. J., in McFadden

This erroneous view can he traced to a misconception of a note
to the third volume of Christian's Blackstone. Greenleaf in his book
on Evidence (section 37o) says the witness is not to be interrogated,
citing the note in question. This note has a different meaning from the
one accredited to it. The note says, "But I have since heard a learned
judge declare at nisi prins that the judges had resolved not to permit
adult witnesses to be interrogated respecting their belief of the Deity
and a future state. It is probably more conducive to the course of
justice that this should be presumed till the contrary is proved." The
true meaning of this note is not that no adult witness may be permitted
to state his belief, but merely that he ought not to be.interrogated until
the presumption of his belief has been overcome by extrinsic evidence.
That is. as Greenleaf remarks immediately after, a witness ought not"
to be scandalized by being asked such questions in the absence of any
evidence tending to impeach bis religious convictions. 3 Christian's
Bl. 369 (Eng. ed.).
Greenleaf further says that one is not questioned heforb he is sworn
for the purpose of hearing his testimony as to facts, but merely for the
purpose of ascertaining his capacity to understand and relate, etc. This
is inc'nsistent with the next section, 371, where he says'each witness
is to be sworn in the manner "wh;ch hc shall declare to he binding on
his conscience," and that the proper time to make this inquiry ii before
he is sworn.

This view of Greenleaf has, however, been adopted by some American
text writers (see Headley on the Competency of Witnesses, p. 23), and

i4 the foundation of the decisions referred to.
541: Clintonz v. State,
'C. IL T. R. R. Co. v. Ieuckafelloe, 17 Ill.
33-Ohio St. 27: .lrnd. v. Anding, 53 Md. 192; 2o Amer. Law Review,
95; Hagan v. Carr, Phila. Co., Pa.. C. P. 284, D. T. 1898 (unreported
case); Quinn Y. Crovell, 4 iVhart. .334: Jones v. Harris. i Strobh. i6o;
Rmidntt v. State, x Swan, 411; Jfai'rel v. State, t Head. 125; U. S. v.
3 .McLean, 175; Thurston
White. 5 Cranch C. C. 38: V. S. v. 'enncdy.
4
v. lJhitneyr 2 Cush. io4; The .Merrimac,i Ben. 49o. The repetition of
authorities in detail is unnecessary. as. the most common way of ascertaining the belief is,as is well known, by interrogating the witness

himself. See cases cited supra.
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v.Com., ' says: "When a witness is objected to for defect of
religious belief. the rule is to let him speak for himself, and
if he professes faith'enough to give a religious sanction to
his oath. his testimony is taken." and in Cubbison v.McCrearv, Sergeant, J. commented unfavorably upon the
rule in Connecticut and New York to the effect that the
witness himself could not be heard.
Inasmuch as the only feasible way of ascertaining one's
religious principles is through his own declarations, the
absurdity and uselessness of the rule excluding atheists and
unbelievers becomes clearly apparent. What is the purpose
of the exclusion? Not to punish a man for an impious
avowal,-not for impudently asserting that there is no God.
We do not exclude him because he is an atheist, but because
we assume he will not speak the truth; because we think not
having the religious sanction, he will not feel bound to keep
faith with the court. But since we must depend upon his
own candor to enable us to exclude him on this ground,
therefore we deny him the right to testify, because we believe him when lie says he is an atheist.
Bentham in his own forceful, half-humorous style thus
puts it, "Next let the answer be, Yes, I am an atheist. Then,
indeed, the man must be an atheist; at any rate he must be
taken for an atheist. But shall this answer be regarded
as a piece of evidence warranting the exclusion? No, surely,
and for this reason: The answer is either false or true. .If
false, the. supposed cause of the exclusion fails in point of
fact. le is not an atheist; he cannot, therefore, with propriety be excluded on the ground of atheism. If the answer
be true, the cause of exclusion falls to the ground; the presumnption of mendi-acity. the presumption
grounded on the
61
atheism is proved to he erroneous.
It requires a man of more than usual frankness and
regard for the truth to avow such sentinients upon such an
occasion. If he does avow them the consequences are severe.
IHe subjects himself certainly to criticism, if not to infamy, as
was once thought; lie makes it impossible for himself to be
a witness, in a case in which perhaps lie desires to testifyPa. 12.
"'2 W. & S. -62.
,ncnthaim's
Judicial Evidence, Vol. V, p. 129.

"3
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possibly he may be an expert who depends upon his right
to testify for his living. The presumption therefore of
mendacity is not only completely destroyed, but is supplanted by another, the strongest kind of presumption that
the witness will adhere strictly to the truth. He may indeed
be lacking the religious sanction, but lie has shown that the
other inducemenis to truth-telling are present in him to an
extraordinary degree. How palpally inconsistent to exclude
such a man and to admit an abandoned criminal who declares, whether true o" false, that lie believes in a God!
But the rule fails to do what it purports to do, viz: exclude believers. Whom does it exclude? Some believers,
yes. Those who are incredible, no. Those unbelievers who
declare they believe are admitted, while those who declare
their real sentiments are excluded. In short, the abandoned
lying atheist is a good witness, but -a conscientious, frank
one, never! Let us assumne that the common law presumption is a true one, viz: that the atheist will never tell the
truth, but goes about seeking to deceive. all, persons on all
occasions. Suppose such an one is interrogated on his voir
dire. How easy to say lie believes, thus escaping all the
infamy of an impious avowal and rendering himself competent to impose his lying evidence upon court and jury!
The supposed security, therefore, in fact does not exist.
The next question which it is proposed to discuss is as
t6 the propriety of hearing evidence concerning one's religious belief for the- purpose of affecting his credibility
as a witness. The common law rule, as laid down by
Chief Justice Willes in Omychund v. Barker, 3 is that evidence may be introduced to show that the witness is not a
Christian for the purpose of attacking his credibility. He
says: "Before I conclude this head I must beg leave again
to take notice of what is said by Lord Hale, that it must
be left to the jury what credit must be given to these infidel
witnesses. For I do not think that the same credit ought to
be given either by a court or a jury to an infidel witness as
to a Christian. who is under much stronger obligations to
swear nothing but the truth. The distinction between the
cofipetency and"credit of a witness is a known distinction

,Wlles,

at p- $$0.
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and many witnesses are adhmitted as competent to whose
credit objections may be afterwards made. The rule of
evidence is that the best evidence must be given that the
nature of the thing will admit. The best evidence which
can be expected or required according to the nature of the
case must be received. but if better evidence be offered, on
the other side. the other evidence, though admitted, may
happen to be of no weight at all. To explain what I mean,
suppose an examined copy of a record (as it certainly may)
be given in evidence; if the other side afterwards produce
the record itself, and it appears to be different from the copy,
the authority of the copy is at an end.
"To come nearer to the present case; supposing an infidel
who believes in a God and that He will reward and punish
him in this world, but does not believe in a future state, be
examined on his oath (as I think he may), and on the other
side to contradict him a Christian is examined, who believes
a future state and that he shall be punishied in.the next world
as well as in this, if he does not swear the truth, I think
that the same credit ought not to be given to an infidel as to
a Christian,. because he is plainly not under so strong an
obligation."
It is startling, to say the least, to think that at this day
evidence can be introduced to show that a witness is a Jew or
a Mohammedan or a Buddhist, for the purpose of lessening
his credibility, but the lav has not been changed since Oinychund v. Barker, except partially in America. The reason
it has not been is probably due to the fact that such evidence
is rarely introduced, almost never has it been in America,
except in a few cases to impeach the evidence of Chinese
64
witnesses."
In ordinary cases it would probably prejudice the jury
against the side of the party offering it, much more than it
would incline them against the testimony of the "infidel."
"See 'cople v. Chin Mock Sow, 51 Cal. 597, where the court allowed
evidence to be introduccd as to the Chinese idea about transmigration
of souls. The real purpose was probably to impress the jury with the
absurdity of such ideas and thus raise a doubt as to the intelligence of
the witness. In this particular case. however, the counsel failed to connett the witness with the belief in question.
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The production of evidence to show unbelief or atheism.
however, is not at all uncommon and it may be done for the
purpose of attacking the credibility of the witness in Englan(15 and in nearly all the states and territories in America.
In fifteen express statutes allow the credibility to be thus
attacked 0 and in all the remaining ones, with four exceptions, there is no provision on the point, hence the common
law rule prevails.67
The objections to*allowing inquiry into religious belief
for the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness are
much the same as those which have been discussed in opposition to the rule making religious belief a test of competency.
The great and fundamental objection is that the proof Of
the fact itself depends upon the frankness of the person
under examination, at a time and under circumstances which
The Oaths Act, supra, does not touch the question of the admission
of evidence of religious belief for the purpose of questioning the credibility of the witness, hence the rule is left as at common law.
"Viz: in ARIZONA, cALIFoRNiA, CoLoRADo, CoNxEcrxcur, GEoRGIA,
IDAHo, INDIANA, 'MAINE. -MASSACHUSETTS, MINNESOTA, MONTA.."W
NEV.DA, NEW Nfgxico, TENNESSEE and UTAH.. See appendix.
"The four are ALASKA. KL.NT'CKY, OREGON and VERSmoIr, whose

constitutions forbid inquiry into the religious belief of the witness. See
appendix. As to the rule in -the remaining states, see ttunscom v.
Hunsconi. 17 .Mass.: 184: A:lwood v. Wellon, 7 Conn. 69; People v.
McGarren, 17 'Wend. 46i; People v. Matteson, 2 Cowen, 433 (note);
Cubbison v. .llcCreary, 2 V. & S. -62; Blair v. Seaver, 26 Pa. 274;
Searcy v. Miller, 57 Iowa, 613; Dedric v. Hopson, 62 Iowa. 562; Wilder
v.Peabody, 21 Hun. 376; U. S. Y. Kennedy, 3 MeLean, 175; Jones ,.
Harris, i Strobh, i6o.
In four states however, viz: COLORADo, MICHIGAN, OREoN and VAsHmnGTo.
(see appendi*.) it is forbidden to question the witness conc.rning his belief, so that if-evidence be introduced to affect his credibility, it must be of an extrinsic nature. The same result has been
reached in KANSAS, where it has been decided that the constitutional
provision aholishing religious belief as a test of the competency of a
witness prevents him from being questioned about the subject. Dickinson v. Beal, 6z Pac. 724. In KENTrCKY it has been decided that constitutionai provisions that one's civil rights shall not he affected by his
religious belief, prevent-inquiry into the subject for the purpose of affecting ones credibility as a witness, atheists and believers being declared
to be an absolute eqality. Bush v. Cont.. go Ky. 244. This was also
the rnle in MASSAcIIVSETTs (Coin. v.Buzzell, 16 Pick. 153). until a later
statute altered the law. See appendix.
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most strongly tempt a man to deceive. As has already been
pointed out, the only true way to show the state of one's
mind, and the way it is done in practically all cases where a
witness is impeached on this ground is to examine him. If
he avow unbelief or a belief different from the common one
of the country, it must necessarily expose him to consequences which he would much prefer to avoid. Therefore,
if he has so high a sense of personal honor that he will not
deceive even to save himself much annoyance, to put it
mildly, this instead of casting a shadow of distrust over his
tc-imony should be the best possible proof that it is to be
given full credit.
It should again be recalled that there are maily influences
which in the mind of any ordinary man tend toward truthtelling-the sanction resulting from a religious belief is but
one of these-and in the mind of the average witness it is
a question whether it is of much, if any, practical force.
The prospect of temporal punishment on the one hand, or of
possible pecuniary gain on the other, are of far more im-portance in the minds of many, perhaps a majority of persons who testify upon the stand. than a vague shadowy fear
of some punishment in the dim future, the character of which
is not known to any person upon the earth.
Besides there is always the saving thought that one may
repent before he is called to account for the deeds .done in
the body and thus may escape punishment altogether. Be
this as it may, it is surely incongru6us to urge the fact that
a witness has acknowledged himself to be an unbeliever, as a
blow to his credibility, while the lying, deceitful believer
escapes wholly such imputation.
Then it is clearly foreign to the spirit of our American
institutions to permit such sacred subjects to be probed by
perhaps unbelieving and scoffing lawyers.. The relations'
which exist between man and his God. ought to be forever
secure from prying inquisition. One's belief 6r unbelief,
which are not matters of will or motive, ought to have no
connection with or effect upon any civil right or capacity
whatsoever. The existence of the common law rule is asurvival of the intolerance of the time of Lord Coke, for it*
is based upon the assumption that Christians only are to be
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fully trusted to follow the dictates of honor; and that nonCihritians and unbelievers are perpetually under the ban of
suspicion for tie opinions which they hold and perhaps cannot change. It should be abolished by statutory or constitutional-provisions pernmanently prohibiting any inquiry into
one's religious b elief upon any pretence whatever and estab-

lishing at last entire freedom of conscience.
Irrespective, however, of the rules concerning the admission or exclusion of atheists the oath is still required of most

witnesses in modern judicial proceedings. Having grown
up with the common law. as we have seen. it still seems
firmly imbedded in our legal procedure. Whether it is a
living plant or one from which life has long since departed,
so that it may be safely rooted up and thrown upon the rubbish heap of old and useless customs, is the last topic which
will be discussed in these pages. It is necessary to know
first whether the essential idea which lies at the bottom of
the institution is the same as the one which existed in its
early stages. The entire usefulness of the oath as a guarantee of truth depended, as we have seen, upon a belief of the
witness, that by reason of the ceremony, divine vengeance
is stirred up against him, provided lie tells a falsehood.
This was fully recognized, by both civil and common law,
and is as true to-day as it ever was. Puffendorf defines an
oath to be a religious asseveration, by which we either
renounce the mercy or imprecate tle vengeance of heaven,
if we-speak not the truth, and says."5 "The scope and mean. that persons'might be more firmly
ing of oaths is .
engaged to tell the truth .- . . by the just awe and dread
of the Divinity
whose wrath they thus knowingly

inivite upon their heads if they knowingly deceive." 0' 9
Phillips says, "A witness in taking an oath. must be understood to make a formal and solemn appeal to the Supreme
Being for the truth of the evidence which lie is alb)ut to give.
and further, to imprecate the divine vengeince onf his head
"P. 334
It. Cap. XIII. See. X, satys similarly, .'Forma juris"Grrnthm%. Lir
jurawrt verLi. differt. re convenit. Hlune enim sensum habere'debet, ut

Dens inrocatur, quae duo in idem recidunt"
Fleta and B&ittom supre.

See also definition of
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if what he say shall be false."" 0 There is no doubt that this
is the true and essential comnmon law meaning of an oath.
In Rex v. Jfkhite,71 the court said: "'An oath is a religious
asseveration, by which a person renounces the mercy and
inprecates the vengeance of Heaven if he do not speak the
truth." And in the Queen's case,72 Lord- Chief Justice
Abbott sam(that in taking the oath a witness "has imprecated
the divine vengeance upon his head if what he shall afterwards say is false." We find substantially the same words
used by Daggett. J., in Atwood v. Welton, 3 "The oath is
an appeal to God by the witness for tile truth of what he
says and an- imprecation of divine vengeance upon him, .
if his testimony shall be false." and in Arnold v. Arnold,"4
tile court says, ".An oath is well defined to be a- solemn invocation of the vengeance of the Deity if the person sworn do
not regard the requisit;ons of the oath." Tn its essential
features therefore the oath is a religious ceremony which
is thought to impose upoir the swearer an added obligation
to tell the truth, in that if he violate his oath he will suffer
divine punishment greater than that which he 75
would have
suffered had he told an untruth when unsworn.
.* 1 Phillips on Ev. i6.

" i Leach C. L. 430.

'2

Brod. & Bing.

285.

ts7 Conn. 66, at p. 73. See also Perry's Case, 3 Gratt. at p. 638.
1.3 Vt. at p. 367.

It has been suggested by some text writers that the true purpose of
the oath is not- to imprecate divine vengeance for false swearing or to
impose an added obligation upon the witness to tell the truth, but that
it is to solemnly remind him of his existing obligation to God to tell
the truth at all times. Thus Tyler in his book on Oaths says, at p. 12,
"An oath is an outward pledge given by the juror (swearer) that his
attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to God," and Greenleaf adopts thib sentiment at Sec. 328 of
Vol. x of his hook on Evidence. lie says, "The design of the oatli is
not to call the attention of God to man. but the attention of man to
God : not to call on Him to punish the evildoer. bt on man to remember
that lie will." quoting Tyler's definition. Bet also says, at p. 42, Sec.
58. "Imprecation is. however, no part of the essence of an oath." Almost
the exact language of Greenleaf is u.4ed in a dictun by Ashburn, J., in
Clinton v. State. .33 Ohio St.. at p. 33. lie says: "The purpose of the
oath is not to call the attention of God to the witness, but the attention
of the witness to Gpd; not to call upon Him to punish the false swearer,
but on the witness to remember that He will assuredly do so. By thus
laying hold of the conscience of the witness, and appealing to his sense
of accountability, the law best insures the utterance of truth."
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Omitting al. reference to merely superstitious practices
among-the ancients, a very material idea of the functions of
the Deity was entertained by practially everybody at the
time when the common law was emerging from the chaos
Further credence. to this view is lent by the method sometimes used
to examine children as to the extent of their knowledge of the meaning
and obligation of an oath. In England prior to the act of x869, supr.
(when- unbeievers were incompetent), it was recessary that an infant
should underi'tand the nature and obligation of an oath, else be- could
not be sworn. Best on Evidence, Sec. 151, et seq. But since the disability arising from defect of religious belief has been removed, it is
sufficient if the child has enough intelligence to understand the moral
obligation to speak the truth; the question of some added punishment,
to be invoked by an oath or suffered for its violation, enters not into
the question. 1bi, Sec. i55, et seq.
In America of qourse the same rules shQuld follow. In those states
where the incompetency arising from defect' of religious belief yet
exists, a child should logically be required to give evidence that it
understands (or seems to understand) what is meant by the obligation
of an oath. The courts, however, have in a few cases departed from
this rule. adopting the test of intelligence only; In Com. v. Eilengcr,
i Brewst. 352, a girl nine years old, being questioned as to her knowledge
of an oath. replied: "I would be punished if I told a lie 'without taking
an oath. I do not know the difference between telling the truth here
and elsewhere ....
God would punish me if I told a lie. out of
court." The child was admitted as a witness by Brewster, J., although
it is clearly apparent from the above answers that she did hot understand what was meant by "oath." It is very questianable whether this
decision be sound law, as the qualification of children as to the necessary amount of religious belief has long been recognized to be the same
as that of adults (0 Greenleaf. Sec. 367:.State v. Doherty, 2 Overton,
go: State v. JJashingllJ,42 L R.'A. 553; Slate v. Belton, 24 S. C
at p. i88; Phillips on Ev.. p. ii), the only difference being that in the
one case the de'ct arises from lack of understanding and in the other
from lack of belief. In those cases where dicta seem to lean the other
way. the error' probably arose from the ecamination of similar cases
where the test of religious belief has been abolished, e. g., MeGuff v.
State, 89 Al i47.
It is not very clear .exactly what the eminent authors quoted above
mean by their language. If they mean that the oath, as customarily
administered with the .woids "so help me God" does not include an
express imprecation of divine punishment, but recognize that the ceremony of the oath is thought to impose an added obligation with an
additional sanction, then the distinction amounts to nothing.- If there
is a distinct nbligation derited from the oath resting upon the swearer
to speak truly, then it must be that there will be some greater divine
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They believed that God

stands ready to answer human summons and in an outward
manner to indicate the guilt or innocence of one accused of

a crime.

Trial by the ordeal and trial by battle, both so

punishment for a breach of that added obligation; hence whether he
expressly invokes that punishment or not is of no consequence. If
they mean what the dictum in Clinton v. State, supra, may be construed
to mean, viz: that the oath is intended to impose no additional obligation, but merely to remind the witness of his existing obligations, they
are clearly in error.
The authorities are uniform (unless Clinton v.State be an exception)
that an oath imposes "an obligation" upon the witness. Indeed the very
phrase, "obligation of an oath," imports such a meaning. If the only
purpose of the oath were to call the witness' attention more particularly to an existing duty, there could be no such thing as the "obligation
of an oath." The following cases all contain language too clear to be
mi.understood as to the added obligation to speak truly, which one lays
upon his soul by taking an oath: Blocker v. Burnecss, 2 Ala. at p. 355,
"An oath is a solemn adjurationr to God to punish the affiant if he
swears falsely"; Jackson v. Gridley, 18 Johns at p. 1o3. "It (the oatlx)
is appealing to God to 'witness what we say, and invoking punishment
if what we say be false"; Smith r. Coffln, i8 Me. 157; Bush v. CoM.,
0oore.4 Jones 25; Colter v. The State, 37 Cr.
8o Ky. 24; Shaw v.
Rep. !84; C. M. T. Ry. Co. v. Roekafelowe, 17 I1. at p. 554:7 Blair v.
Scaver, 26 Pa. 274: Brock v. Milligan, io Ohio St. at p. 123; Scarcy v.
Miller, 57 Iowa, 613; note by Thacher, J., 4 Am. Jr. at p. Sx; Perry's
Case. 3 Gratt. at p. 638; Curtiss v. Strong, 4 Day, 5t; State v. W1ashington. 42 L. R. A. 553; Bell v. Bell, 34 N. B. Rep. 615.
Moreover Greenleaf and Best both elsewhere use repeatedly the
phrase, "obligation of an oath," in such a way as to leave no doubt that
they recognize the common-law idea as already explained. Sece r Greenleaf. Sec. 368: "Our law, in common with the law of most civilized
countries. requires the additimonal security afforded by the religious sanction implied in an oath, and as a necessary consequence rejects all witnesses who are incapable of giving this security."
The very form of the oath is conclusive of the point. The phrase,
"so help me God." has always been interpreted, ac we have- seen, to
include a prayer for the continued support and protection'of the Deity
for keeping the oath and a voluntary renouncement of the same in case
of its violation. This is admitted by Mr. F. S. Reilly in an article on
"Judicial Oaths," although lie subscribes to Tyler's idea.-supra, that the
oath creates no additional- obligation, and, therefore, deprecates the
continued use of the common form of imprecation. x Jur. Soc'y Papers,
p. 435. In view of the fact that the original theory of the oath included
an imprecation of vqngeance, the burden of showing that a new idea
has been engrafted upon the old ceremony is clearly uporL those who
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common in England at ,ne time, depended upon this belief.
Men had not "tpassed the stage at which they look to the
supernatural for procif (if doubtful facts. The means of
proc f are solcni ftirmal oaths and ordeals designed to elicit
tile judgment of Gud."' The ordeal depended upon a belief
that God would interfere in a particular case and suspend
natural laws for'the purpose of pointing out guilt or innocence.7 7 The use of oaths both as a mode of proof and as
ahministered to witnesses, were grounded upon an assumption that God's vengeance would follow the breach of them.7
Both the ordeal and the oath therefore are seen to depend
in the last analysis upon precisely the same idea of the interference of God to assist the procedure of the courts.
As there was implicit faith in the result of the trial by the
ordeal, so there was in the efficacy of the oath. God's vengeance would surely follow perjury> hence no man would
dare to lie under oath. Puffendorf says,7 "But when
an omniscient and omnipotent being is called to be both
a witness or guarantee and likewise an avenger, we therefore presume ulmn the truth of what is delivered, because
we cannot conceive any person to be arrived at such a
pitch of impiety, as lightly to stir up the divine vengeance against himself. And hence perjury appears to
be a most monstrous sin, inasmuch. as by it the forsworn wretch shows that he at the same time contemns
the divine and yet is afraid of human punishment." So
firmly fixed was this .idea that no false testimony would be
given by a sworn witness that a claim or defence might be
affirm it. Indeed if the oath does not involve the idea of an additional
bond, then it is of no use whatever, never was, and would long ago
have been abandoned. The idea that it is merely intended to remind
the witness of his existing olligations is wholly fallacious. Those who
favor its continued use do so 6n the ground that in the minds of many
per,.ons it does furnish an additional bond. See infra.
I Poll & Mlait. Hist. Eng. Law, 74.
"See ligelow, Hist: of Proc. in Eng. 32z. Stephen Hist. of Crim.
Law in Eng., p. 73. says: "They were appeals to God to work a miracle
in attestation of the innocence of the accused person." Bracton, Vol.
II,p. 441.
" Oaths were required at every stage of the procedure.
See various
forms (f them in "Bigelow's list, of Proc. in Eng. 249, et seq.
" Page 334.

EFFECT UPON THE COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES.

419

proven merely by the oath of a party suoported by others
who swore that they believed him.60

And so sure were

the ancient lawyers that God's punishment would follow
the crime of perjury, that it was not punished by temporal
power at all; this it was thought would be interfering with
the functions of the Deity."1
The essential thought to be noticed both in the- trials
mentioned and in use of oaths, was that it was the human
ceremony which drew down the attention and action of the
Deity. Where God was invoked to point out guilt He would
do so and not otherwise. He would inflict punishment for
perjury not because lying is sinful but because He had been
invoked as a witness to a lie. The witness was not actuated
by fear of God's punishment for telling .an untruth, but by
fear of His vengeance for violating-an oath. It was not the
essential wrong but the ceremony which afforded the se-

curity.
The dawn of more enlightened thought has destroyed
ur modified these superstitious ideas. The belief that Godwill interfre to rescue an innocent accused person from a
physical predicament disappeared long ago. The ideas as
to the efficacy of the- oath also have been very greatly.
changed. Temporal punishment for perjury was an admission that there was doubt about the perjurer getting his
deserts from a superhuman power. The idea that one will
not dare to lie under oath is so completely obliterated that
one method of impeacling the credit of a witness is to bring
in others who swear they would not believe him on his oath,
a complete reversal of trial by wager of law.8 2
With the decline of belief in the efficacy of the oath there
was a corresponding decline in the belief in its necessity.
At common law some form of swearing by which the witness made an appeal to God was absolutely imperative. No
In IV Bracton, 407, it is said. -Likewise there is a certain oath
which is tendered by a party to a party in judgment or by a judge to a
party, in which there is no conviction. For it is sufficient for them to
wait for the vengeance of God." The procedure in trial by wager of
law is set forth in Anonymous. 2 Salk. 68t. See generally Pollock &
Maitland*s luist, of Eng. Law and Thayer on Evidence.
Pollack v. Maitland.p. 541, citing Brunner D. R. G. 2, 68t; Koval' See 3 Bl. Com. 341
evsky, Droit, coutimier Ossetien, p. 324.
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one could be permitted to testify until he had taken an oath
which could be done according to the ceremonies peculiar
to his own religion.b3 When the members of the Society of
Friends first refused to be sworn there was no thought of
admitting their testimony in courts of justice. What security was- there that they would speak the truth? They
would neither kiss the book, nor raise the right hand and
invoke divine vengeance, nor touch the toe of a priest, nor
hold the tail of a cow, nor crack a saucer, nor perform any
other 'uch ceremony; it was quite clear that their evidence
could not be heard. A mere solemn affirmation that their
"yea- should be yea, and their nay, nay," was as nothing in
comparison with the sanction afforded by these rites."
It is a matter- of history that Friends and other sects
suffered persecution for many years by reason of their conscientious scrupies against taking an oath or in any way
subscribing to a ceremoiny which- involved a reference to the
Deity," and were of course denied the right to be heard in
courts of justice.
Finally, however, there came a change of heart. Perhaps
the incongruity of receiving the evidence of a mendacious
Ilindoo swinging the tail of a cow in his hand, or of a Chinaman burning a joss stick or cracking a saucer and invariably
grinning as he did it,"and refusing to hear that of the plain,
simple, straightforward Friend, finally forced itself upon the
prejudiced minds of the British legislators, Hence in the
reign of William and Mary we have various acts of Parliament "for the relief of the people commonly called Quakers."
The first one of the kind, passed in 1688, allowed Friends to
substitute a declaration of fidelity for the oath of allegiance,
beginning with these words, "I, A. B., do sincerely promise
and solemnly declare before God and the world," etc.87
U i Phil. on Ev. 15; Ornychutid v. Barker, i Atkin, 21; Lord Siaftsbury v. Lord DigbY, 3 Keb. 631; 2 Roll. Abr. 686; Rex-v. Sutton, 4 M.& S. 532 (note at p. 537).

" These methods of swearing heathen witnesscs were all in use; most
of them still are. See infra.
It was expressly provided by 13 and 14 Car. I, C. z, that "Quakers"
refusing to take oaths should be fined any sum not exceeding Is.
"So says T. C. Anstcy. Esq.. in III Jut. Socy Papers, p. 379. e seq.
"- Wrn. & Mary,'C. z&
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Eight years kter, in T696, the idea that only those who
had sw,,rn were fit to be believed was definitely overthrown
by an act allowing -Quakers" to testify on affirmation in
certain cases, in this wise: "I, A. B., do declare in thepresence of Almighty God, the witness of the truth of what
I say," etc."' - Bentham says this exception in favor of
Quakers was made because they of all the people in England
were recognized to he the most truthful. It indicated a
tremendous change in public sentiment. It was an abandon-.
ment of all previous ideas oil the subject to allow any person to give evidence without having first called dowr upon,
himself the wrath of God if he spoke falsely. The members
of the Society of Friends were not pleased with the form
of declaration as they objected to subscribing to any ceremonial involving what they believed to be a profane and
impious reference to the Deity. Parliament, therefore, again
intervened for them in 1721 and prescribed the form of
affirmation now in general use, viz: "I A. B. do solemnly,
sincerely and truly declare and affin ,"'89 etc. These provisions have since been extended to Moravians and Separatists and those who have once been members of these sects,
and finally to all persons of any denomination who state
that they have conscientious scrulAes against swearingG
When the raw was changed so as to admit atheists and unbelievers it was provided that their testimony also should
be received on affirmation.0' The same law in all particulars
"7 & 8 Win. & Mary, C. 34. Made perpetual by i Geo., i Stat. 2,
C. 6.
"8 Geo. i,C. 6.
-2 Gceo. II, C. r3; 22 ceo. II, C. 46; 9 Geo. IV, C. 3z; 3 & 4 Win.
IV, C. 49; 1 & 2 Vict., C. 77; 6 & 7 Vict.. C. 22; 17 and i8 Vict., C.
125, Sec- 20: 51 & 52 Vict., C. 46; Bretts Comm. on Laws of Eug., Vol.

11, P.833.

0117 & 18 Vict, C. 125, Sec. 2a; 5! and 52 Vict., C. 46. It was provided in the latter act, "Every person upon objecting to being sworn,
and stating, as the ground of such objection, either-tiat he has no.
religious belief or that the taking of an oath is contrary to his religious
belief, shall he permitted to make his "solemn affirmation instead of
taking an oath- in all places and for all purposes where an oath is or
shall be required by law, which affirmatibn shall be of the same force
and effet as if lie had taken the oath." There were anciently in England
myriacLs of pron6sory oaths, which had to be taken upoii. every conceivable occasion, e.g., university oaths. cumtom house oaths, military
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has been exteiicled to India." and in Canada all who have

conscientious -;cniles mav affirn.ly
When the first settlers- caine to America from England

tliey of course brought with them the English law as to

oaths, and unless that law were changed by some express
enactment, it would continue to bind thet The only colony
which would be at all likely to attempt an innovation
at a time when oaths were reqtired in England on all occasions. was the Quaker province of Pennsylvania.

Accord-

ingly in the laws agreed upon irEngland in162, by William Penn and those who had associated themselves with
him for the pur, pse of founding the new colony, we find
one--which provides that testimony shall be given in the
courts upon simple affirmation without oath as follows: "All
witnesses. coming or called to testify their knowledge in or

to any matter or thing in court, or before any lawful authority within the said province, shall there give or deliver in
their evidence or testimony. by solemnly promising to speak
the truth,-the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, to, the
matter or thing in question. And in case any person so
called to evidence shall lie convicted of wilful falsehood. such
person. shall suffer and undergo such damage or penalty, as
the person or persons against whom he or she bore false
witness. did or should undergo-; and shall also make satisfaction to the party wronged, and he publicly exposed as a
false witness. never to he credited in any -court, or before
any magistrate, in the said province." 94

This law was far in advance of any English law of that
day and indeed of this day. and was consequently soon interfered with by the English government and was repealed by
its action in 169 3 .9 5
Thc act of 1696. however. which extended to Quakers the
oaths. etc. Their absurdity and u-elessness was recognized early in the
nineteenth centnr. and a great many. in fact nearly alt such oaths. have
hen alx,lishel except oatih, of allegiance and some few official oaths.

c & 6 Win. IV. C.6f.: t4& 15 Vict.. C. 99:31 & 32 Vict.. C. 72; 34 & 35
ViCt.. C. 48" "Ilndkm Oaths Act." Anglo-Indian Codes, Vol. I1.appendix. p. 937.
'Can. Ev.. Act of tFo3. .- wction 23
M I Col. Rec. XXXII.
"See Sharpless, "A History of Quaker Government in Pennsylvania,"
Vol , Chap. V.
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privilcge of testifying on affirination was made applicable
1(, the American cuilonies sO that mnembers of that society,
except during a short period in Pennsylvania, were never
sulljectCd to persecution in America for refusing to swear.

At the time of the Declaration of Independence the law
in England allowed only "Quakers" to affirm. Owing to
the advanced ideas on the subject of religious liberty in
America we might expect more latitude in their early constitutions. Some -of them justified this expectation, but
others did not. Lack of space prevents an extensive historical review, but in brief the thirteen original colonies
generally provided for the affirmation of Quakers; some
included Dunkers and 'Mennonites, and a few all persons
having religious scruples against swearing. -Some had no
express provision. hut in their absence the law would stand
as it was before the Declaration of Independence, i. e.,
Quakers only could affirm.
Sentiments of liberality in America have since that time
grown steadily, the new states being especially liberal on
such matters. Any person having religious scruples against
swearing may (as in England) affirm in every' state or
territory of America except North Carolina, 96 in which
only Quakers, Dunkers -and Mennonites are allowed such
privileges. In nine of these states the affirmation may be
taken by any person irrespective of scruples against the
oath. 7 In the constitution of Idaho it is provided "Any,
person who desires it may at his option, instead of. taking
an oath. make his soleni affirmation or declaration," etc.
The provisions of the other states are similar.08 All which
admit unbelievers do so upon affirmation.
"See appendix.
" The nin" states
MONTA

A,

NEVAi).D,,

are ALoAnANIA, COLORADO. FLORIDA, GEORcA, IDAHO,
RiHODE ISLAND, lTAII and VEST VIRGINIA.
See

appendix.
" It has been decided that where the act provides that the affirmation
may be taken only where the witness ,-tate%that he has conscientious
scrupleo against swearing. this statement must be drawn out by the
colrt or objection to the cvi(knce may be taken. even -after verdict.
Reg. v. Moore, 6T L J. M. C. So. in which an Indian. student requested
the usher to administer an affirmation but did not state why he
declined to swear. The judge phaid no attention to him, and his evidence
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What is the true significaice of this. legislation? The
testimony of a very large class of people, some of whom
are devoid of any religious belief, is admitted unsworn.
Although some text writers, have said that the affirmation
is in effect an oath,0 9 yet this must he taken to mean only
thaf those who affirm do so under the- pains, and penalties
of perjury: There is no appeal to God-no imprecation
either expressly or impliedly of His vengeance--merely a
solemn declaration that the witness will- speak the truth.
Therefore the supposed added obligation by the religious
ceremony is wholly lacking. And yet does any person ever
seek to question this testimony because it is unswom? On
the contrary no distinction is or can be made betweent that
which is sworn and that which is unsworn, but is received
or, affirmation only.
In Great Britain and her colonies and in all the American
states evidence received on oath and that received on affirmation (if given by tlose having scrupTes against sweariig)
is accorded equal weight. And in nine American states
sworn evidence and affirmation evidence (irrespective of
"scruples") is received without question and upon the
same footing. Practically the latter rule is almost universally true. i. e., it is customary for the court crier to
administer the affirmation without any interference either
by court or attorneys merely upon a request by the witn1esS.

00

was admitted. For this reason Hawkins, J., assisted by Wills, Charles,
Lawrence and Wright, quashed the conviction of the defendant, against
whom the evidence in question had been given. This rule would probably not apply where the act does not expressly say that the witness
must state that he has religioni scruples, but merely that he must have
them. It is perhaps a question whether it would he followed in
America anyway. See, however, Wfilliamson v. Carrolt, i Har. 217;
Stat- v. Putnam. Coxe. 260; Anon., Pennington 93o; State v. Harris.
2 1Ial. 361; Co.re v. Field, i Green. 215. all New Jersey cases, which
decide that an indictment or deposition taken upon- affirmation must
set forth thit the affiants are Quakers or have scruples against swearing.

" See "Judicial. Oaths," by F. S. Reilly, Esq., L Jur. Soc'y Papers,
439; Wloodeson, star p. 154.
"I have upon all occasions affirmed instead of taking the oath, and
although I have made this request many tines, never once have I been
-alled upoiT to state iy- membership in the Society of Friends or asked
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All lawyers. and many who are not, know that when a
jury or any number of persons are to be sworn together, the
crier first says, "'Allwho swear put your hands on the book,"
etc.. and after the oath has been administered, "All who
affin.- come forward.", etc., or some similar phrases, no
questions being asked and no distinction whatever being
made between the two classes.
These facts clearly show that, at least from the point of
view of those to be affected by the evidence, there is no distinction between the solemnity of the two ceremonials.
What is the conclusion? That the idea of an added obligation imposed upon the witness by an appeal to God has vanished-that no intelligent persons any longer believe that
God stands ready in the guise of a "sheriff's officer," asBentham puts it, to devise and inflict a special punishment
upon a man for the violation of a ceremonial.
But they show more than this, not only that there is no"
belief in the, oath in its true common law significance, but
that even adopting the erroneous ideas.of Tyler,1 * to the
effect that an oath can be deemed merely as a riminder of
one's existing obligation to God, it is no longer thought to
be of the slightest importance whether .the witness swears
or affirms. "' This is due to two facts:
i. There is no such reminder in the oath as usually ad-ministered. The common form consists: First, Of a promise
to tell the truth; and second, of the words "so help you
God." The whole is administered in the monotonous singsong voice so common to court criers and is usually abfuptly

followed by the query, "What's your name?"

Instead of

being calculated to impress the witness with any ideas of
God and I is laws, it is merely a species of profanity. 1 ".
why I preferred to affirm, and nearly always have these reque.ts been
made in Pennsytvania courts, where theoretically only those stating
that they have conscientious scruples are at liberty to affirm.
a See note spra.

In point of fact this is not the main purpose of the institution of
the oath. hit it was deemed to act as a solemn reminder as well as to
impo.e an added tic.. See supra.

" Edward A. Thomas, in an article in the North American Revici
for September. R8..says: "'N'twithstanding the dignity of our courts
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2. The conviction of most men that religious belief or
dtty to God. if firmly rooted in one's nature, will govern

hin on all tIccasitons without the assistance of a "'reninder,"
and that if he has no . nfficient convictions of his duty to
God in the matter of truth-telling, such convictions are not
likely to be suddenly called into being by the dreary song
of the court crier.
It seems therefore that modern legislators, judges and
attorneys. think of the oath merely as a form to be gone
througi with by the witness, for the purpose of notifying
him that from the moment he subscribes to it his words
become of great importance because they are spoken upon
a judicial occasion when the rights of others depend upon
them-that he is expected to tell the truth without, equivocation or concealment-that should he fail to do so, tis
words will probably be shown to be false by cross-examination and that in case of detection, punishment for perjury
awaits him-a promise is also exacted from the witness, to
which, if he be an honorable man and particularly if he has
of justice, the customary methods of tendering oaths are far from
impressive, and to people possessed of great veneration are somewhat
shocking. The person who administers them is not usually eminent for
piety. To obtain the. position of clerk, ie must rather have evinced
political shrewdness and profound sagacity. He is far better acquainted
with the voters of the Ninety-ninth Ward than with the Psalms of David
or the Holy Gospes. lie hardly seems to be the proper person to
invoke the Supreme Being to aid a faltering witness, or to denounce the
wrath of heaven upon the one who gives false testimony. Upon the
opening of a term of court, one of the first duties of the clerk is to
swear the grand jury. Directing the one who has been selected as
foreman to stand up, he hurries through with the prescribed form in a
manner scarcely intelligible to those even who are familiar with it- The
rest of the grand jury are then sworn in squads and platoons, without
having the oath repeated to them. and at the close the man-of cleanliness and refinement is compelled to how dawn and kiss the saute
ancient and greasy volume, which for years has been used for similar
purposes, with his next neighboxr. whose mouth has never known a
tooth brush, whose lips -are, dripping with tobacco juice, and whose
breath is redolent of whisky and oniins. Is it remarkable that some
shold p-efcr to he sworn with the uplift d hand? Then as each witness
takes the stand the Suipreme Being is again called in by the ckrk to
assist inmthe judicial proceeding, and to brace up the witness to do his
-duty."
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religious convictions, he will strictly adhere./3 All this
the affirmation accomlplishes. The query then naturally
arises, why retain the oath, a religious ceremonial which
appears to have become hut an idle form?
The proposition to abolish the use of the oath altogether
is not 'a new one. Aside from the influence of religious
people who d6 not believe in swearing, many legal minds
have for more than one-hundred years conceived that this
ceremony has outlived its usefulness.10 4 Bentham, writing
early in the nineteenth century, says that it is utterly useless
and that the supposed obligation which it imposes upon the
witness is a myth; that he heeds it not at all in comparison
with the other influences which affect him.105 Pothier thus
expresses his convictions,'0 0 "A man of integrity does not
require the obligation of an oath to prevent his demanding
what is not due him. or disputing the payment of what he.
owes; and a dishonest man is not afraid of incurring the
guilt of perjury. In the exercise of my profession for more
thaii forty years, I have often seen the oath deferred; and I
have not more than twice known a party restrained by the
sanctity of an oath from persisting in what he had before
asserted."
The Indian Law Commissioners, in a report in i856,
" There are no doubt many members of the above-mentioned classes
who would deny holding such an opinion. All that is meant is that theexisting legislation and customs point to the universality of such an
estimate of the oath.
The abolition of a large number of oaths used on non-judicial occasions was accomplished in England a number of years ago. Chitty's
Eng. Stats., Col. ViII, title "Oaths and Affirmations." See supra.
Bentham on Ev., Vol. I. Chap. 6. Bentham satys, however, that if
the oath is to he used at all it should be made effective, and makes
various snggestiORs tending to that end. Thus he says. inter alia, that
it would he well to emphasize the terror of religious punishment by
having upon the wall of the court room a copy. of "lRaphael's painting
of the death of Ananias and Sapphira" (who were killed by divine
punishment for false testimony). lie also suggests that the penalty
for perjury be inscribed in raised letters upon a tablet and placed before
the witness and a graphic portrayal of a convict suffering the usual
punishment for the same offence be exhibited to him, to both of which
a court officer shall, af the proper moment (presumably as he is about
to tell a lie), call his attention by a motion of a wajid. See I Bentham
on Ev., p. 3 99
3Wx Ev. Poth. Sec. 831.
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recinmiended the entire abolition of oaths.in Indian courts,
lut their recommendation was never acted upon.1 0t

Thomas Chishoin Anstey, Esq., in a paper read before
the Juridical Society of England in i86SIOs says, "In comnton with many persons. I entertain the opinion that the
abolition of all oaths whatsoever. judicial or promissory, aflirmative or compihrgatory, would be a very wise and useful
measure; and my convictions on that head have rip'ned
and strengthened with an experience of many years spent in.
various countries of the Queen's allegiance." In a pamphlet
written shortly after the introduction of the "affirmation
act" into the House of Commons. 'Mr. Justice Mellor says,
"Profoundlv convinced by along judicial experience of the
general worthlessness of oaths, especially in cases in which
their falsity cannot be tested by cross-examination or be
criminally punished. I have become an advocate for the
abolition of oaths as the test of truth.109
Best, in a very recent book on evidence (Ed. of 1902),
says, "Would it not be the most desirable course . .
to substitute affirmations for oaths in every case, to print on
each subpona a statement of the punishment of perjury,
and to ad(l a repetition (if such statement to the affirmation
which each witness is about to make."110
Sir Herbert Stephen. Bart.. referring to oaths in criminal
cases, says. "Some people seem to have a notion that a statenient made on oath has an almost mechanical advantage
in credibility over one which is not so made. I am not sure
wheth:!r this belief is founded upon the theory that the moral
difficulty of telling a lie when you have sworn to tell the
truth is necessarily and invariably greater than the moral
difficulty of telling a lie when you have not so sworn or
whether the idea is that the fact of being on oath gives to
the matter deposed a supernatural tendency towards accuracy. independently of the dep 'nent's volition. In either
case- I am perfectly satisfied that this view is wholly and
absolutely chimerical. . . . To imagine that any prisoner
who would assert his innocence without oath would hesiFirst Report. p. 53.

1,.j Jur. Sme. Papers. 371.

S'e pampllht "'Sugge-.mions a. to Oaths,' by J. M.
eP,'t on E'. (tVd. of 1902), p. IS5 N.
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'No doubt there

|bave been in the world's testimony, and. are now, many

persons willing to lie, but afraid to lie in some form of
peculiar sanctity. No human being in England is willing to
lie in a court of justice. vet afraid to dc so because be-has
kissed a book after listening to a well-known formula. Witnesses are constantly heard in the criminal courts telling
gross and unquestionable lies. They do so-if at all-as a
rule, with the most entire willingness, and if any caution
makes them hesitate (which is not *often) it is being reminded. not that they ire upon oath, but that they are liable

to prosecution for perjury.""1
In our own country ir. Justice Redfield remarked in his
opinion in the case of Arnold v. Arnold,' " lecided ih184r,
"Almost all sober and especially religious men, have for
many years, in ruminating upon reforms in our system of
jurisprudence, sincerely regretted the very unnecessary frequency of oaths: and not a few men of that same class have
even questioned the necessity of resorting to the sanctity
of an oath. in any department of the civil administration."
Edward A. Thomas, in 1882, wrote. "In this land of
freedom no particular religious faith is recognized.* Why
should ancient forms of religion and of superstition be
insisted upon? While liberal laws have been enacted which
permit a person to be affirmed or to swear in the presence
of the ever-living God. without making use of the Gospels
if he so desires, what benefits can accrue from maintaining
a practice which shocks the sengibilities of one class of the
community and excites the derision of another? Why
would it not he sufficient if the laws provided ample penalties against all who should give. false evidence upon the
witness stand. and that the clerk of the court should distinctly state to each witness at the commencement of hisexamination what those penalties were? Why not adopt a
rule which in this enlightened age will permit all citizens
of this great country, whether their beliefs accord with that
of Washington or of Penn. of Jefferson or of Parker, to
give their testimony in court, or to enter upon the duties of
office, on the same equality and under precisely similar
"Prisoners on Oath,"

p. 21.

3J2

1i3 Vt. .162.
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forms, without enacting what may seem to be a sacrilege to
one and a mummery to another?'""1
Other articles favoring the total aboli"'N. A. Rez, for Sept., x188.
tion of oaths are L. C. Whiton, "The Abolition of Oaths," 29 Alb. L. J.
344; J. H. Hopkins, "The Supernatural Element in the Oath." j8 Alb.
L J.413; 26 Ir. L T. 471.
Air. Edward Gardner's paper before the "National Association for the
Promotion of Social Science," discussed in i Jr. L T. (1867), 591; 7
Jr. L T. 425; Benj. P. Moore in 18 Am. L. Rev. 5o3; C. A. Smith, 5
Solicitors' Journal and Reporter, 5x; "Oaths in Courts of Justice," 6
Law. Rev. 26.; "Oaths. Judicial and Extra Judicial," by R. H. Thornton in i Inter. Law J. 177; "The Oath," V. Scottish Law Rev. & Sher.
Ct- Rep. io6; 5 Sol. J. & R. 52; J. L. H. in an article "On Judicial
Oaths" in 19 Am. Jurist, 77, says (p. 85): "The uselessness of oaths
Ve believe that we may hazard
is a matter of everyday' experience.
the assertion that the testimony of most members of the profession
would be that the oath offers a very slight if any security for veracity.
There is no class of men whose veracity is so much relied on as the
Quakers, who never use the oath. The Anabaptists in Holland have
been suffered to testify for over two hundred years without the oath.
To the Mennonites, a branch of the Anabaptists; belong a very large
share of the wealth, commerce and influence of Holland. The witnesses
before committees in both houses of the.British Parliament are examined without oath. The peers of England are never required to take
the oath in delivering their testimony in courts of justice. Oath evidence is not required in court-martials. No inconvenience has ever
resulted from the disuse of the oath in these cases. And there are no
peculiar motives to veracity, which apply to these individuals and cases,
which will not apply to every case and every individual. We may then
say that the testimony of experience is decided that affirmations and
the natural obligations of duty are sufficient."
A great deal of discussion about eaths was created in England a few
years ago by the famous "Bradlaugh case." Chas. Bradlaugh, who
had been elected to Parliament, asked to be affirmed instead of sworn
upon taking his seat, stating that he had no belief in God. The privilege was refused him, and afterwards he presented himself to be sworn
in. This also was refused him. on the ground.of his agnosticism. He
then took the oath himself without its being administered, took his seat
and-voted, for which he was afterwards punished by the House of
Commons. See a review of the case in :z4Journ. of Jur. 3=2; 25 lb.
34; 69 L T.75; lb. 223-j9 Jr. L-T- 451. See also generally article
on "Oaths,'! 12 Journ. Jur. 629; "The Making of Oaths," 3! Jr. L. T.
& SoL J. 441; "Parliamentary Oaths in Foreign .Countries," a6 Jour.
iJur. 356; "Oaths in Legal Procedure," 4 Am. Lawyer, 249; "Swearing
Witnesses," 56just, Peace. 83; "The Use of an Oath," iC. L. J. 438;
18 Am. L. Rev. 5o2: "Oaths and Affirmations." 3 Law Rev. 212; j8 Jr.
. L. T. 7
L- T. iW9 z J;r
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On the other hand, the English Common Law "Commissioners, intheir report for 1853.1 4 said, "The expediency
of examination upon oath has in recent times been much'
called in question. It has been urged that where the. moral
.and legal sanctions to speak the truth are insufficient, the
religious sanction, acting with a more remote, motive, will
have little or no effect: vhile the reliance placed on the
efficacy of an oath tends to lull the tribunal which has to
deal with the evidence into a false security. To this, however, it may be answered that this reliance on the oath results
from the general experience of mankind of the effectof the
religious sanction in this respect on the minds of .men. It
can, we hardly think, be doubted that there is a large class
of persons who though less alive than they ought to be to a
sense of moral duty or to the fear of legal penalties, yet
may be deterred from falsehood when to these is added the
dread of diine vengeance. Moreover, we-.think it cannot
be doubted that the effect of a transition from the use-of
judicial oaths to simple declaration would, at least at the
outset, by removing one of the barriers to falshood, encourage false testimony and tend materially to lessen the confidence of the public in the administration of justice."
Before proceeding further it should be observed that
should the oath be abolished this would in no sense destroy
the solemnity of the proceeding. The only change would be
in administering on all occasions the same ceremonial which
is now administered theoretically in some and practically
in all the states at the option of the witness. The only
change would be the omission ifi
the ceremonial of all reference to the Deity. The argument, therefore, in favor of or
against the continued retention of the oath mustbe directed
solely to that one element, viz: the appeal to God because
all other elements are retained by the affirmation.
What is the argtiment in its favor? It will be found to
rest upon the assumption as set forth above in the report
of the Law Commissioners, to the effect that there is a large
class of persons who, through ignorance or, superstition,
still believe that there is some special punishment reserved
for those whb violate an oath, other than that which would.
Second report, p. 4.
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be suffered hv one who tells an untruth while unsworn, e.g.,
when testi fying upon affrination." 5
This argument- depend. for it validity upon the further
assunipthon that this class, if it exists. is compellable to so
testifv under oath. and hence can be frightened into truthtelling.
It is very doubtful whether either assumption be true.
Suppose we have an individual who has been called, as a
witness upon a judicial occasion. If he tells the truth, injury
will result to him. He desires to lie. He weighs the chance
of detection and punishment and decides to take the risk.
If he is religious he knows lying is sinful, he decides also
that he will risk punishment by divine justice. Now, is it
probable that he will by virtue of having taken an oath
which as usually administered is of little or no solemnity,
relinquish his previous purpose and speak the truth? It is
barely po.sible, although surely the probabilities are extremely remote.
"'It appears difficult at the present day to conceive the
character of a person who. neither fearing the penal enactments of man against false witnesses, nor the denunciations
of God against liars; a person who would not hesitate to rob
his neighbor of all his possessions by means of false testimonv, nor to send him to the penitentiary or the gallows
by the same instrumentality; yet who, in opposition to his
own interest, would be restrained from the comrmissi6n of
all these enormities solely by the sanctity of an oath and the

fear of the additional punishment in the future world. He
"It is a very common habit of witnesses when testifying to use such
expressions as "Being on my oath, I would not like to say so and so,"

or "I would not like to swear to that." etc. These expressions are
pointed out by the upholders of the oath'in confirmation of the assertion that it has a deterrent effect. These expressions., however, prove
nothing unless it can be demonstratti that the witness using them is
deterred by the particular clement of the appeal to God and not by the
other elements present in the oath. It is quite as reasonable to suppose
that a witness uses %ucl"expressiois because, since he is testifying upon
a judicial occasion when the rights of others are involved, and when
legal punishment is threatened for falifying. unusual care must be
observed. They are.very common whether the witness be sworn or
affirmed. and mean nothing except a real or feigned desire to be accurate
upon a judicial occasion.'
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might reason with himself that man. unable to prove his
guilt, would not punish him; but that an omniscient God
certainly would. Could not God as readily perceive and
punish the sin of making a false statement, by which an
innocent man would be defrauded, imprisoned or judicially
nmurdered? If a'y man does exist with the character just
described, he mist closely resemble that robber mentioned by
Irving, who had no scruples whatever about cutting the
throats of several of his fellow-beings before breakfast for
a small sum of gold; but was thrown into an agony of remorse when he learned that he had been eating a piece of
meat upon a fast day."1 1 6.
But what about the seconl assumption? Can we require
this man to take the oath and thus frighten the truth out of
him by the fear of divine vengeance? No. at all. He does
not have to take the oath. In nine states he will express his
preference to affirm-no questions can be asked; it is his
right, although the reason he prefers to affirm may be that
he desires to lie, unsworn. In the remaining states and
territories and in England he will in all human probability
also be allowed to affirm without question, But suppose he
is challenged. Suppose he is asked, "Why do you wish to
affirm?" He replies, "I have conscientious scruples against
swearing." This is a lie, but he has already made up his
mind to lie when not bound by the tie of the oath. What,
therefore, becomes of the security afforded by the oath?
Nothing can be clearer than that it is utterly dissipated.
Tivo classes of witnesses are sworn:
I. Those who have no scruples against swearing; but who
intend to and do tell the truth.
2. Those who have no scruples of any kind. either against
swearing or lying.
Two classes are likewise affirmed:
I. Those who have conscientious scruples against swearing. and who will and do tell the truth.
2. Those who have no scruples against lying, but who
declare they have :against swearing, because they are afraid
to lie under oath (-f this class really exists).
It therefore becomes apparent that the only persons who
Mr. E. A. Thomas' article, referred to, supra.
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are compelled to swear are conscientious, upright persons,
who will not falsely allege scruples against swearing. All
mendacious witnesses are either quite indifferent as to
whether they lie with or without oath, or else by exercising
the right to choose. they lie without it.
On the other hand. it has been suggested that very few,
if any, witnesses would think of such a method of escaping
the oath. The idea is that a witness will not appreciate the
solemnity of the proceeding in his previous determination to
lie. but when actually confronted with the fact that he has
taken an oath, he will weaken or break down completely.
The "breaking down" in such cases may be due to one or all
of various causes:
I. Confusion under dross-examination.
2. Fear of temporal punishment for perjury.
3. Fear of divine punishment for lying.
4. Fear of divine punishment for violating the ceremony
of the oath.
The first three are equally present in both oath and affirmation. The last is peculiar to the oath. Assuming for the
sake of argument that the last element is the "straw that
breaks the camel*s back," and proves the undoing of the
witness. the contention is that the witness will not, at least
in all cases, foresee this predicament in which he will find
himself, and. therefore, will not adopt the simple expedient
of taking the affirmation.
In the first place. will the witness who has determined to
perjure himself blunder into- taking a cereinony which he
fears to violate? I doubt this very much. Committing
perjury is not such a light matter. If one has determined
to take all the risks, he wotild surely have carefuly thought
out the whole thing in his mind, and if, braving detection
and imprisonment, he is afraid to lie after hearing the
crier say. "so help you God." surely he will ascertain, if he
does not already know. that he may avoid the oath by
affirming. A method which must be less satisfactory .has
long been in ue by mendacious witnesses. i. e., to kiss the
thumb instead of the book. However, it is- fair to assume
that nn some odcasions. there may be witnesses who fear
neithier man's nor Gods punishment for lying, who forget
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either to kiss the thumb instead of the book or to substitute
the affirmation for the oath and then may be frightened into
disclsing the truth through the reiterated. "Remember you
are on your oath" of counsel, when a similar reminder, "Remember you are on your solemn affirmation," would have
been wholly ineffective. It must be confessed, however, that
the probabilities of such a combination of circumstances
seems exiremely remote.
With this most liberal assumption as to its efficacy the oath
seems all but useless. Since it has become such an integral
part of our system of procedure. however, it may be the
part of prudence to retain it. This is the position assumed
by many who admit that logically its present use is -an
absurdity, but who declare that they feel its power in the
courts. They say they can see its deterrent influence upon
witnesses, who. if questioned, could not tell themselves why
they are affected by it. There is a widespread belief among
members of the bar. that to admit all testimony unsworn
would be a dangerous experiment and would materially increase perjury.
This feeling is perhaps nothing more than the sentiment
always encountered when a change in existing institutions
is proposed. It is a little hard to understand why a lawyer,
who will not even take p~iins to see whether his jurors or
witnesses take oath or affirmation, -should profess so great
an apprehension when it is proposed to allow all alike to be
affirmed. It is a striking reminder of the early days in
Pennsylvania. when there was a great outcry of horror in
England because two British citizens had been condemned to
death by Quaker juries, the members of which were unsworn.'!? However,, before deciding that we should bow
before a "feeling" which cannot be justified by logical
reasons, it' is but just thait the positive arguments against
the use of the oath shall be considered.
The first is to the effect that an oath is avowedly but an
imposition upon the ignorance or superstition of the witness.
No intelligent man at this day pretends to believe that it is
any greater sin to tell an untruth upon oath than upon31 St
Sharpless' "History of a Quaker Experiment in Governmnet,"
Vol. I. p. 149 (Hay. ed.).

4.36

oAvris IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AND.TIHEIR

affimation-it is the lie not the violation of the ceremony
that is wicked. \Vhen taken by such a man the oath is
hypocritical. The words, if they mean anything. involve the
most awful consequences. But it is safe to say that it would
be extremely difficult to find anyone willing to admit that
he has the slightest belief in the ceremony to which he
subscribes. The man who lacks belief in God is incapable
of taking- the oath; but a belief in the vengeance of God
for false swearing is an equally essential part of it; then all
intelligent men are In fact ineligible. The only persons
truly capable are the ignorant and credulous, whose superstition or "feeling" is made use of to further the administration of the courts. Probably there are some ignorant

persons who believe many other witch's tales, long since
become the laughing stock of the world, but the administration of justice ought not to be rested upon such a foundation.
It is particularly to be regretted that the competency of a
child should ever be determined 1y his real or apparent
belief as to what will happen to him if lie tells a lie while
under oath. Rev. F. Dennison Maurice, in a paper read
before the Juridical Society of England, says, "A child is not
taught by wise parents the meaning of kissing a book. It
is taught not to lie, it is told that God is true and hates lies.
If you substitute one kind of teaching for the other, when
it comes into a court. you do not obtain fresh protection for
its veracity: you lose the protection that you had. . . . If,
on the other hand. the child has been taught to lie, if it comes
primed with lies into the witness box, your terrors will not
frighten it. The expectation of the flogging which awaits
it at home. if it stumbles into any wrong confessions. will be
far more effectual than the apprehension of any more distant
punishment which may be in reserve for it if it does not
speak all that it knows."1'1 8 The test of a child's capacity
ought never to be his understanding of the obligation of an
oath-it should be merely his capacity to observe and relate
.and whether he understands that he is required to speak the
truth. lie should never be required to take an oath-a
species of profanity which we feel. especially, should never
be forced upon him. The extract from the examination
III Juridical Socivt Papers, io5.
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quoted in the note, shows that a child is often intentionally
deceived for the purpose of making him appear competent.
The further possibility of his being told that "'the old bad
Imill will burn him up." or that he "will he hung" if he d6es
not tell the truth, ought to be abolished. 11 '
mThis subject as to the proper test of an infant's capacity is too
large to he treated in this paper. I feel very strongly that the test in all
cases should be wholly disconnected from any question of religious
belief, and that a simple affirmation only should be administered. The
principal cases which'have been decided on this point in America within
the last fifteen years are here cited for the convenience of those who
may care to examine this phase of the subject further. ALABAMJA: Test
is intelligence only: McGtiff v. State, 88 Ala. r47, 1889; Grimes v.
State, io5 Ala. 86, 1894; 1iliamis v. State, iog Ala. 64. 1893; Walker
v. State, 32 So. 703, 1902. ARKANSAS: Arbitrary age limit fixed by
statute: St. Louis L 3. & S. Ry. Co. v. Wrrcs, 6s Ark. 61g, i8g8.
GEORGIA: Test seems to be intelligence' only under the code by the
earlier decisions: .ohsoun v. State,'76 Ga. 76, t885.
The following extract from the examination of the witne-s, a child
six years of age (referred to in the text, supra), is instructive:
"BY THE COUR:

"Q. Who made you? Do you know?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. Don't you know thai God made you?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Did you never hear about that?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Did you never hear about the old bad man?
"A. No,sir.
"Q. That gets bad children and burns them up?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Did you never hear about that?-"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. 'When they tell lies?
"A. Yes. sir.
"Q. Did you never hear about people going to the penitentiary or to
jail for telling lies?
"A. No. sir.
"Q. Don't you know that if you were to tell a lie, and a man were
hung on your evidence, that you would be hung too?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Which is the proper thing for you to do, to -tell the truth or to
tell a lie?
"A. To tell the truth.
"Q. Which is it right to tell. the truth or a lie?
I don't know, sir.
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Another objection to the oath as now used is the discrimination made by requiring certain peopie to swear, while
others are permitted to affirm, this objection is re-enforced by.
the inconsistency above noted, viz: that those only are compelled to swear who are entirely reliable and therefore need
no guarantee that they will speak the-truth. Even in the
"Q.Do you know that there is any difference between telling the
truth outside of the court house and inside of the court house?
"A. No, sir."
The child was admitted. Moore v. State, 79 Ga. 498, 1887; Minton v.
State, 99 Ga. 254, j896; but see Miller v. State, io9 Ga. 512, i9oo.
TExAs: Method of testing seems to be largely within discretion of
trial judge: Parker v. State, 33 Texas Cr. Rep. hI, 1894; but hinges
on whether the obligation of oath be understood. Partin v. State, 30
S. W. io67, 1895; Murphy v. State, 36 Tex. Crim. Rep. 24, i896; Mo.
K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 37 S. IV. 771, 1896; Chapman v. State, 42
S. W. 5g. i897; Scroggins v. State, 51 S. W. 232, 1889; Click v. Slate,
66 S. W. i1o4. 19o2. But the religious phase of the obligation of the
oath seems to have been lost sight of. Saucedo v. Stote, 69 S. V. 142,
i9o2. IL.tiols: Test is intelligence only: McAm ore v. Wiley, 49
Ill. APO. 615, x893; Epstein v. Berkowsky, 64 111. App. 498; Featherstone
v. People, 194 1]). 325, 19o2; DISTRICr OF COLUMBIA: Test knowledge
of right and wrong- Williams v. U. S., 3 App. Cases D. C. 335, 1894.
PE eSYLVANIA:

The test seems to be knowledge of the obligation of

an oath: Coin. v. Carey, 2 Brewst. 404; CoM. v. Wilson, 186 Pa. i,
1898; but see Com. v. Ellenger, I Brewst. 352- MIssouRI: Test intelligence only: Brashears v. W. U. Tel. CO., 45 Mo. App. 433, 1891;
Slate v. Doyle, 1o7 Mo. 36, 1891; Slate v. Velson, x32 Mo. .184, 1895;
State v. Prather, 136 Mo. 2, 1896. MAssAcnusETs: It seems that
the child must feel and understand the religious character of the oath:
Com. v. Lynes, 142 Mass. 577, 1886; see, however, Com. v. Robinson,
165 Mass. 426, z896. SoUTH DAKOTA: Test seems to be intelligence
only: State v. Rcddinglon, 7 S. D. 368, 1895. TENNEssEE: Test seems
to be intelligence only: Burke v. Ellis, io5 Tenn. 702, I9oo. WEST
VbriNlA: Knowledge of religious obligation of the oath is ess.atial:
State v. Michael, 37 W. Va. $6s, z893. IowA: Knowledge of the obligation of the oath essential: Stale v. Todd, 82 N. W. 322, x9oo. UTAH:
Intelligence only under statutes: Stale v. Blythe, 20 Utah. 378, 1899KA-;s : Ibid., Stale v. Douglas, 53 Kan. 669, 1894. Naw Yoa:
Knowledge of oath essential: People v. Luisey, 79 Hun. 23, 1894;
People v. Frindcl, 58 Hun. 482. AtizoA TERRITORY:

Test knowledge

of oath: Donnelly. v. Territory, 52 Pac. 368, 1898. MICHIGAN: Test
seems to be intelligqnce: Very full discussion in Hughes v. Ry. Co.,
NEB s*RA: Ability to understand nature and obli65 'Mich. io. tS8.
gation of oath, seems to be a test of intelligence under the statutes:
Davir v. Slate,31 Neb. 247, i89i; State v. Meyers, 46 Neb. 152, i8g5-

EFFECT UPON THE COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES.

439

Roman times a proposition to swear to a promise -was
deemed a reflection upon one's integrity. Shakespeare makes
Brutus say:
'Bri.

Give me your hands all over, one by one.

Cas. And let us swear our resolution.
Brit. No, not an oath: if not the face of men,
The sufferance of our souls, the time's abuse,SOUTH CAROL NX: Knbwledge of oath essential: State v. Belton, 24
S. C. 185, 1885. VIsco.sIN: Knowledge of o-th seems to be essential:
Stae v. Juneau, 88 Wis. i8o, x894.
A list of older English and American authorities on this point is
also here given. This list does not purport to be complete. It consists
only of those cases which. have been incidentally examined during the
preparation of this paper:
English cases: Rex v. Dunnell, I East P. C-442; Rex v. Brosier, r
Leach C. C. i99; Rex v. Powell, Ibid., iio; Reg. v. Weal and,L X aW
Q. B. D. 827; Reg. v. Pruntey, 16 Cox. C. C. 344; Reg. v. Williams,
7.C. & P. 32o; Reg. v. Holmes, 2 F. & F. 7$8; Reg. v. Bayli, 4 Cm.
C. C. 23; - Reg. v. Outaghan, Jebb. C. C. 27o; Reg. v. Nicholas, 2C. &
K 246; Rex v. Traverse, i Str. 7oo.
American cases: Cor. v. Mullins, 2 Allen, -96; State v. Levy, 23
Minn. ao8; State v. Scanlin, 58 Mo. 2o6; State v. Doyle, 1o7 Ibid. 36;
Buck v. Ry. Co., 46 Mo. App. 555; State v. Jeffersro, 77 Mo. 138;
Ridenhous v. Cable Co., xoz lb. 288; State v. Denit, 19 La. Am. "o;'
Washburn v. People, 1o Mich: 374; Brown*v. State, 2 TeX. App. IizS
Burk v. State, 8 Tex. App. 34t; Hilliams v. State, Ia Tex. Am j27-,
State v. Manuel, 64 N. C. 6ot; State v. Edwards, 79 N, C. 650; Smith
v. Cor. 85 Va. 924 Van Pelt v. Van Pelt, 3 N. J. L. 2ca, Ano. 3
.X.
L 47; Blackwell v. State, Is Ind. 196; Johnson Y. State, 6s- Ga. 3;
Peterson v. State, 47 Ga. 524; Johnson v. State, 76 Ga. "76; Statr v.
Sn'erson, 78 Iowa, 654; State v. JackSon, 9 Or. 459; People v. Bera*,.
zo Cal. 66; 'People v. IVesh, 63 CAL.167; State v. It Blanc, z Treadw.
354; State v. Richie, 28 La. Anh. 327; People Y. fcNair, 2z Wend. 6o;
Maguire v. People, 44 Mich. 286; State v. Whittier, 21 Me. 3a; SlaU V.
MareO, 2 Ala. 278; Carter v. State, 63 Ala. 54; Simpson v. Stae, 3t
Ind. go; Holmes v. State, 88 Ind. 147; Fknagin v. State, 25 Ark. 96;
State v. Doherty, 2 Overt. 8o; Oliver v. Com., 77 Va. 59o; Hoks v.
State, 23 Tex. App. 1; Davis v. State, 31 Neb. 241; Com. v. Hutchinson,
to Mass. 225; IWade v. State, So Ala. 164; Brashert v. W. U. Tel Co.,.
45 Mo. App. 445; Cadmos v. St. L. Bridge Co., i5 Mo. App. 86; Ake v.
State, 6 Texas App. 402; Moore v. State;79 Ga. 498; Logstox v. State,
3 Heisk. 414; Vincent v. State, lb. iio; Draper v. Draper,68 71i. z9;
Davidson v. State, 39 Tex. za9; Reason v. State, 7z Ala. x91; Cor v.
Lynes, i42 Mass. 577; Taylor v. State, 22 Tex. App. 53o; Kelley v. Stat, 75 Ala.'2a; Jenner's Ca.. 2 City Hall Ric. 14Y; Jones v.People,.
6 Park. Crm. Rep. i-8; IWheeler v. U S., 159 U..S. S2&
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If these be motives weak, break off betimes,
And every man hence to his idle bed;
So let high-sighted tyranny range on,
Till each man drop 1y lottery. But if-these,
As I am .-ure they do, bear fire enough
To kindle cowards and to steel with valour
The mehing spirits of women, then. countrymen,
What need we any spur but our owa cause.
To prick us to redress? what other bond
Than secret Romans. that have spoke the word,
And will not palter? and what other oath
Than honesty to honesty engaged.
That this shall be. or we will-fall for it?
Swear priests and cowards and men cautelous,
O( feeble carrions and-such suffering souls
That welcone wrongs; unto bad causes swear
Such creatures as men do1bt; but do not stain
The even virtue of our enterprise,
Nor the insuppressive mettle of our spirits,
To think that or our cause or our performance
Did need an oath; when every drop of blood
That every Roman bears, and nobly bears
Is guilty of a several bastardy,
If he do break the smallest particle
Of any pri'mise that hath pass'd from him.120
Another objection is the profanity of the oath. Even if
it were administered in a reverent and solemn manner, it
would still be shocking to the religious feelings of a large
portion of the c',nmmuuity. This is amply demonstrated by
the fact that provision is made in all English-speaking
countries for those who have rieligious scruples against
swearing. Irrespective of the grounds of this belief, that
swearing is sinful, that fact that it is possessed by a very
large atid eminently respectable portion of the community
should be entitled to great weight. In some parts of Pennsylvania, largely inhabited by members of the Society of
Friends and their descendants, the affirmation is much more
frequent than th oath and one who swears is looked upon as
'"Jul.Cavs.. Act IrLSk. i.
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of almost doubtful character. 121 But the oath is not adniinistered in a solemn and reverent manner, on the contrary,
it it, administered on practically all occasions in a very
light and irreverent manner. Even if one subscribes to the
The Society 'of Friends. commonly called Quakers, who were
among the earlidst Christian sects to take an advanced stand against
the oath, and indeed all others who hold similar religious views, base
their objections to it both upon a natural repugnance to irreverent
reference to God- and also upon the Commandments in the Scriptures.
There are many instances in the Bible where swearing upon judicial
occasions is referred to. It was not forbidden in the anti-Christiaw
era. but was fully sanctioned. Christ. however. conmands a complete
reversal of custom in this matter. lie says, in Matthew v. 33-37: !'Ye
have heard that it hath been said by them of old time, Thou shalt not
forswear thyself. but shalt perform unto the Lord thine oaths: But I
say unto you, Swearnot at all: neither by heaven, for it is God's throne:
Nor by the earth. for it is his footstool: neither by Jerusalem, for it is
the city of the Great King. Neither shalt thou -swear by thy head,
hecause thou anst not make one hair black or white. But let your
communication he Yea, yea; Nay, nay: for whatsoever is more than
these cometh.,of evil."
It is said by Dr. Paley, by Milton and by others whose ideas have
been incorporated into the articles of the English Church. that oaths
before "magistrates" are not forbidden.by the passages quoted. It is
contended that these words refer only to profanity as commonly understood. This position, however, is as to this .passagc clearly untenable.
In the text quoted from the sermon on the 'Mount, Christ was speaking
of oaths taken upon solemn occasions, not merely of vain and wanton
speech. He refers to thv laws of "old time." which permitted swearing
and prohibited only false swearing. It cannot be supposed that these
laws of "old time" permitted vain and wanton profanity. Then He must
have been dwelling upon solemn obligations undertaken under oath.
Then follow H]is words. "But I say unto you, swear not at all," fol
lowed up by a positive injunction. 13tBt let your conmmunication be Yea,
yea; Nay. tiny: for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil."
It is said the intervening w'ords specifying various oaths which may
not be taken and not mentioning an oath taken in the name of God
impliedly permit stch an oath. This argument is not convincing however. In the face of-a jio-itive prohibitiom. further particular prohihitions could not have such an effect. Moreover. it is declared in Matthew xxiii. 22. that to swear ly heaven is'to %wearby the Deity, hence
swearing by the Deity is likewise forbidden. There is more force in the
argument that later on in the Scriptures. various apostles and indeed
Christ Himself t6ok an oath. It fails, however, to convince many people
and did not the early Chriqtian. who opposed swearing. Anyone who
feel- further interested in the views of those who cannot conscientiously
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dictrine of the English Church. that swearing before magistrates is not forbidden by the Scriptures and therefore
has no scnples against it, yet such continual reference to the
most sacred name surely can be thought of as little better
than "vain and false swearing."
Aside from our own moral or religious feelings concern-

ing this subject the law, as it stands at present concerning
so-called "heathen" witnesses, subjects them to the probes
of lawyers and judges into their belief. In twenty-eight
states and territories there are express statutory provisions
that each witness may be sworn in the manner most binding

on his conscience.' 22 This is merely declaratory of the rule
at common law which would be the same in the absence
of such legislation. The manner of ascertaining the manner
of swearing most binding on the conscience of the witness,
is by interrogating him."
The witness is entitled to be
swear will find them quite fully set forth in Dymond's Essays on
Morality, Chapter VII; Tertullian De Idol, Cap. I, and Grotius' Rights
of War and- Peace, are authority for the statement that the early Christians unlerstood the use of oaths to be forbidden. to thent.
"Viz:
'ALASKA. ARIZONA, ARKANSAS, CALIFORNIA, CONNIXrzCUT,
DIE-LA.ARE, I1DAIIO. INDIANA, INDIAN TERRITORY, MAINE. MARYLAND,
MASS.CIIWS-T,
MICHI(;AN, M, NE.OA. NTISsOUst, MONTANA, NEDRASFA. NEvADA, NEW ,-ABSIISIRE, NEwV YORK, OREGON, SOUTH CAROLINA, TENNESSEE, TEXAS, UTAH, WASHINGTON, WISCONSIN, WYOMING.

See appendix.
" This is admitted by all text writers, -even those who object to
ascertaining whether a witness has religious belief by-so interrogating
him. Sec t Greenleaf on Ev.. Sec. 371. There is of course no security
that the witness will not name some ceremony which has in fact no
binding effect upon him whatever, hence the security sought for by this
rule does not exist. Mr. T. C. Anstey. in a paper read before ihe Juridical Society of Great Britain, 3 Jur. Soc'y Papers, 379, says that the
ceremony commnmly used for swearing a Chinaman, by his cracking a
saucer and declaring that if he thoesnt . tell the truth his soutl- will be
cracked lke the saucer. has in fact no existence whatever except in
English courts. That it. with several other similarly absurd methods
of taking oaths, was invented by imaginative Englishmen and accepted
with glee by tie Chinamen, to whom it means no more than to us. In
fact no oaths are ever administered in the Chinese courts, according to
the best information on the subject. Alabaster on Chinese Crim. Law,
P. 497.
There are several other ridiculous methods of swearing witnesses
which arc occasionally called for in- our courts. An instance happening
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protected frinm such an inquisition, sometimes not too serious
into suhjectq which to him are most sacred. 2 4 Moreover, the
time for the performance of strange barbaric rites in courts
of justice has surely gone by. If they afforded great security
they might be tolerated, but since they do not, they should
be abolished.
There is a final objection against the use of oaths which
does not depend upon purely ethical considerations. There
is a large class of persons who not only have consciefitious
scruples against swearing, but also against administering.
oaths. This is particularly true of the Society of Friends.12 5
in New Jersey, where an attorney demanded that a Chinaman be sworn
by the ceremony of decapitating a chicken, is mentioned in i9 N. J. L
J. 3o. Of course not having Hindoo witnesses in our courts very often,
it seldom becomes necessary to bring a cow into court or to allow the
Hindoo. to go through the ceremony of tou hing the toe of a priest, etc.
"hIn People v. Chin Mook Sow, 5z Cal 597,.a Chinaman.was exam-.
ined with respect to his religion, an extract from which examination is
here given, to show its general character:
"Q. Does not belief in regard to being transformed into a chicken,
duck. hog or horse extend simply to a probational time?
"A. For a certain time.
"0. And then?
"A. They die and become transformed into some other animal again.
"Q.A little higher in respectability?
"A. According to the degree of their crime. If,they are a little bad.
they will be-transformed once or twice; if they are more bad they have
to- go through eight or ten transformations, and then be burn again still
as a human-being.
9".B1 THE COURT.

"0. Dces the fact whether the chicken is a- good chicken or not make
any difference?
"A. When it is transformed into some :other animaL
"Q. The character of the chicken makes no-difference?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. He never gets to heaven afte. he once got into an animal form?
"A. After having gone through different transformations they will
be born as human beings in this world. And-if they are unusually good
they go to heaven, and if unusually bad they have to go through the
same operation again..
"Q. So he has another opportunity to come back to the earth and
discharge his ditty and get to heaven?

"A. Yes, sir." .
'" See Sharpless,"A History of Quaker Government in Pennsylvania,"
Vol. I (Hay. ed.), pp. 133, x36.
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As a matter of fact Friends who maintain their standing
in their society are to-day excluded from holding the offices
(if judge. magistrate, or any other office as a part of the
duties of which they may be called upon to administer
-laths. 12'
This.is nut true religious liberty. This is not consistent with the- spirit of the Constitution of the United
States or of the various states. If persons having conscientious scruples against administering oaths are capable
of filling such offices creditably, and there can be no doubt
of this, they and the community are both injured by a rule or
custom which prevents them from becoming candidates. If
William Penn. the great founder of Pennsylvania, were alive
to-lav. it would be impossible for him to hold the office of
judge or magistrate.
The time surely has come when affairs secular ,ind affairs
religious should be separated finally. When the duties of
civil office should be definitely severed from all questions
which could affect the religious belief of a possible inctim1 27
bent.
Thomas Roeburn IVhitc.
In Pennsylvania for a number of years after Win. Penn founded
the colony no. oaths whatever were administered. (See law quoted
sul-ra). Later, however, through interference from England. the use of
the judicial oath wa- required. One having conscientious scruples could
be affirmed, but there was no provision that a Quaker judge could
administer affirmations to those having no such scruples. As a result
the Quakers resigned their offices as judges or magistrates, and declined
thereafter to become candidates for such offices. Their conscientious
belief has compelled them to persist in such pction until the present day.
See Sharpless. "A History of Quaker Government in Pennsylvania,"
Vol. 1, Chap. V. It is not impoqsible even now that witnesses may he found who
decline to swear for other reasons than. conseientiou' scruples, and
hence may he barred front the witness stand. It ik stated in 12 Law
iulng.
2R7 that there are mainy women of the poorer clas. in Ireland who
refu'e to be sworn (particularly (hiring pregnancy), for superstitious.
reasons.
"Legislation having this for its purpome has already been agitated
frr many years in some states, and has been succesful in some. in
Maryland the imprecatory form of oath in judicial proceedings has been
aboli-hed by recent legislation, largely through the instrumentality of
Benjamin P. Moore. humember of the Society of Friends. The form
of affirination there. prescribed by the act of m88. Pub. Stats.. Art. I,
section 8a, is:
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"The form of judicial and all other oath. to be taken or administered in this state and not prescribed by the constitution shall be as
follows: 'In the presence of Almighty God. I do solemnly promise or
declare,' etc.. 'and it shall not be lawful to add to any bath the words,
.so help me God.' or any imprecatory words whatever."
Similar legislation has been introduced in the legislature of North
Carolina and I nderstand in Delaware, and is likely to be enacted at
the present session (:903).
This form is yet not entirely satisfactory to Friends, because it contains a reference to the Deity. The omission of all such reference
would be a decided gain.
Mexico has in this respect gone beyond any state in this country.
The law there is, "The simple promise to tell the truth . . . shall
be substituted for the religious oath in its effects and penalties." Hall's
Mexican Law, Sec. 120i. This provision was first enacted I- understand
in 1878.
California made an effort in i9oi to abolish all references to the
Deity in their form of oath, but the act Was declared unconstitutional
in 134 Cal. 291, for reasons which had nothing to do with, its subject
matter. The law as passed was: "Section 2o94. An oath or affirmation in an action or proceeding may be administered as follows, the
person who swears or affirms expressing his assent when addressed -in
the following form: 'You do- solemnly swear (or affirm as the case
may be) that the evidence you shall -give in this issue (or matter)
pending between and shall be the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth.'" (Conmissioners amendment, approved
March 8, igoi: took effect July, igo.)
A law in these or similar words ,would I 'think be.a great step in
advance:
"All witnesses in any judicial proceeding shall before testifying be
required to subscribe to the following form of affirmation: 'You do
solemnly mid sincerely declare and affirm that you will answer truly
and fully all questions that may be put to you unler the direction of
the court in the matter now pending between and -,
and
no religious ceremony shall in such casis be required.'"
It will be noticed that in this act the usual 'form of affirmation, i e., a
promise to "tell the truth. the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,""
his been varied. The old form has been justly criticised, because it
does not accurately express the true promise which the witness intends
to perform, viz: not to tell all he knows about the.case, but to answer
"truly and fully" only those questions which the court permits him to
answer. The form here given seems a more sensible as well as a more
accurate method of expression.
Since writing the above I have received a letter from a Japaneseex-judge, Fukusanbura Yamada, disclosing the fact that no ceremony
at all was required until recently, and that their present fdrm is in fact
not an oath. as there is no imprecation and no reference to the Deity.
The letter is in part as follows: "I am very glad to answer your

4-46

OATHS IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, ETC.

question concerning oath in our land. In ancient times in Japan, as in
China and Corea at present, we had no ceremony concerning oath.
However after we adopted European system of procedure, we use
similar ceremony with yours. If a witnesser appear to a court, judge
will ask him his name and command him to make oath; then clerk stand
up and will read the sentence of oath. which, printed in a paper, 'I
swear that I will tell the truth according to my conscience, don't conceal or add anything.' then witnesser will sign his name and seal his
stamp on the paper:'

